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UPSTREAM TAX PLANNING: A CASE STUDY OF 
WHY CONGRESS SHOULD INSTITUTE A GENERAL 
ANTI-ABUSE RULE* 
JAY A. SOLED** 
Tax abuse—a process by which taxpayers secure tax outcomes that directly or 
indirectly contravene congressional intent—is a commonplace phenomenon 
that has plagued the nation’s economic fabric since Congress instituted the 
income tax. A typical pattern associated with tax abuse is as follows: one or 
more taxpayers devise a methodology to mitigate their tax burdens in a way 
that skirts their civic obligations, the practice becomes widespread, and 
Congress responds by instituting reform measures. Often, however, the 
legislative process takes years or, in some cases, decades to unfold; in the 
meantime, billions of dollars of tax revenue are lost. 
Consider the case of upstream tax planning. This is a process by which 
younger-generation taxpayers gift appreciated assets to older loved ones with 
the expectation of receiving such assets back in the form of outright bequests or 
in trust for their benefit. After the application of the Internal Revenue Code’s 
“basis equal to fair market value” rule, the transferred assets are cleansed of 
their former gains, making upstream tax planning very financially enticing. 
Using upstream tax planning as a case study, this Article advocates that 
Congress enact a general anti-abuse rule that vests the Treasury Department 
with broad administrative authority to promulgate anti-abuse regulations 
whenever the agency perceives a tax-compliance problem. The grant of such 
administrative authority combined with its utilization would yield a vast 
improvement over the status quo: it would safeguard the nation’s coffers in a 
faster and more timely manner; enhance and invigorate taxpayer compliance; 
and, where necessary, shape the Code into being more standard based rather 
than rule based in nature. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Taxpayers are employing a technique that is depriving the federal 
government of significant revenue.1 Commonly referred to as “upstream tax 
planning,” this technique involves taxpayers transferring appreciated assets to 
the elderly with the expectation that such assets will be returned to the 
taxpayers or given to their children or grandchildren with their embedded tax 
gains completely erased after the death of the elderly transferee.2 This tax-
minimization device is not some hidden, dark secret; to the contrary, a quick 
review of articles found in the popular press and online attests to this 
technique’s popularity.3 
 
 1. See, e.g., OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, A BUDGET FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE: ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 151 tbl.13-1 (2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ 
spec_fy21.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3GE-BT3W] (estimating, in row sixty-nine, the annual cost 
associated with step-up basis of capital gains at death (in other words, the application of the “basis 
equal to fair market value” rule) in 2020 to be nearly $52 billion); Jay A. Soled & Richard L. 
Schmalbeck, Determining an Asset’s Tax Basis in the Absence of a Meaningful Transfer Tax Regime, 10 
COLUM. J. TAX L. 49, 57–59 (2018) (explaining that the annual cost associated with taxpayer utilization 
of Internal Revenue Code section 1014(a) is staggering and anticipated to grow rapidly in the absence of 
a meaningful transfer tax system). 
 2. See I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1) (deeming the tax basis of inherited assets to be equal to fair market 
value on the date of death). 
 3. See, e.g., HECKERLING INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING, PLANNING AFTER THE 
2017  TAX  ACT  3  (2019),  https://media.law.miami.edu/heckerling/2019/brochure/53_Heckerling_ 
Brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/7H2P-VPNF] (highlighting a presentation given by Lester B. Law 
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But from a sound public policy perspective, there are several troubling 
aspects surrounding this technique. First, relegated to being a wallflower, the 
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) is at a loss to curtail taxpayers from 
engaging in upstream tax planning.4 Second, even though politicians from 
across the political spectrum would likely agree that this sort of tax planning 
violates the spirit of the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”), they would also 
readily acknowledge that eliminating this loophole via legislation could take 
years or decades to achieve.5 Third, taxpayer utilization of this technique 
exacerbates the nation’s already teetering fiscal situation6 and puts its solvency 
at further risk.7 
 
and Howard M. Zaritsky that covered upstream planning); Jonathan Curry, TCJA Supercharges 
‘Upstream’ Estate Tax Planning Techniques, 158 TAX NOTES 1845, 1845–47 (2018); Karen Hube, An 
Old Tax Dodge for the Wealthy Is Making a Comeback, BARRON’S, https://www.barrons.com/articles/ 
upstream-planning-tax-dodge-51556918447 [https://perma.cc/CZ2D-7DR8] (May 7, 2019); Edwin P. 
Morrow III, The Optimal Basis Increase and Income Tax Efficiency Trust: Exploiting Opportunities 
To Maximize Basis, Lessen Income Taxes and Improve Asset Protection for Married Couples After 
ATRA (or: Why You’ll Learn To Love the Delaware Tax Trap) 107–11 (Dec. 2017) (unpublished 
outline), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2436964 [https://perma.cc/9VSB-
WVWS]. 
 4. The only way that the IRS could possibly challenge this transfer tax technique would be 
under the so-called step-transaction doctrine. See Philip Sancilio, Note, Clarifying (or Is It Codifying?) 
the “Notably Abstruse”: Step Transactions, Economic Substance, and the Tax Code, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
138, 138 (2013) (“The economic substance and step transaction doctrines are two specific examples of 
courts’ general willingness to sometimes look past transactions’ technical form and impose taxes based 
on their underlying substance.”). However, in the transfer tax context, courts are generally reluctant 
to apply those doctrines. Jay A. Soled, Use of Judicial Doctrines in Resolving Transfer Tax Controversies, 
42 B.C. L. REV. 587, 602–03 (2001). Albeit, on rare occasions they have done so. See, e.g., Brown v. 
United States, 329 F.3d 664, 672–73 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that, under the step-transaction 
doctrine, a husband’s gift to his wife, who immediately paid the husband’s gift tax, were interrelated 
steps that should be amalgamated into one). 
 5. For a discussion of section 1014’s obscure origins dating back to Treasury regulations issued 
in 1914, see, for example, LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FIGURING OUT THE TAX: CONGRESS, 
TREASURY, AND THE DESIGN OF THE EARLY MODERN INCOME TAX 85–88 (2018). Although the 
origins of section 1014(a) are unclear, for the past century section 1014(a) has remained in the Code 
to facilitate the perceived administrative difficulty of making accurate asset tax basis determinations 
at death. See, e.g., Howard J. Hoffman, Drive To Repeal Carryover Basis Goes into High Gear, 9 TAX 
NOTES 211, 211–12 (1979) (explaining the perceived need to repeal carryover basis and instead apply 
the basis equal to fair market value rule); Stefan F. Tucker, Thoughts on Radical Estate and Gift Tax 
Reform, 91 TAX NOTES 163, 165 (2001) (“It can be extraordinarily difficult to trace the historic basis 
of many assets, such as personal property held for generations within families for reasons of family 
history or affection, rather than because the property was not marketable.”). 
 6. See Jim Tankersley & Emily Cochrane, Budget Deficit on Path To Surpass $1 Trillion Under 
Trump, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/21/us/politics/deficit-will-reach-1-trillion-
next-year-budget-office-predicts.html [https://perma.cc/27E5-FHSH (dark archive)] (Aug. 22, 2019) 
(“The deficit — the gap between what the government takes in through taxes and other sources of 
revenue and what it spends [in excess of receipts] — will reach $960 billion for the 2019 fiscal year, 
which ends Sept. 30. That gap will widen to $1 trillion for the 2020 fiscal year, the Congressional 
Budget Office said in updated forecasts . . . .”). 
 7. See generally OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 1 (highlighting various points on 
insolvency in federal programs). 
99 N.C. L. REV. 643 (2021) 
646 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99 
Make no mistake about it: upstream tax planning is part of a broader 
problem of tax abuse, which is defined as “when a taxpayer reduces its tax 
liability by ordering its affairs in a manner that complies with the text of the 
statute but contradicts the intent of the law it purports to follow.”8 Taxpayers 
routinely utilize the Code’s literal language to achieve results differing from 
the law’s intent, and their actions are often met with impunity.9 Examples of 
tax-abuse techniques range from taxpayers making tax-free gifts using grantor-
retained annuity trusts 10  to reformulating their business enterprises to 
circumvent their employment tax obligations.11 Upstream tax planning makes 
for an emblematic case study specifically due to its lack of novelty. 
Which taxpayers are most likely to avail themselves of these tax-saving 
techniques? It is not low- or moderate-income taxpayers but rather high-
income taxpayers perched on the upper socioeconomic tiers.12 In other words, 
the taxpayers who are most likely to use these morally questionable techniques 
 
 8. Orly Sulami, Tax Abuse—Lessons from Abroad, 65 S.M.U. L. REV. 551, 558 (2012). 
 9. See, e.g., Chamberlin v. Comm’r, 207 F.2d 462, 471–72 (6th Cir. 1953) (holding a tax-free 
preferred stock distribution to common shareholders, followed by its sale to an accommodating investor 
and then its redemption by the corporation, to be valid, notwithstanding the fact that these steps were a 
coordinated effort to secure favorable capital gains treatment in lieu of such funds being treated as 
ordinary income). 
 10. Grantor retained annuity trusts (“GRATs”) are sanctioned under Code 
section 2702(a)(2)(B) and section 2702(b). I.R.C. § 2702(a)(2)(B), (b). The Code permits settlors to 
establish trusts, retain the right to a fixed annuity for a term of years or over the settlor’s life, and 
have the remainder interest pass to targeted beneficiaries. See generally Mitchell M. Gans, GRIT’s, 
GRAT’s and GRUT’s: Planning and Policy, 11 VA. TAX REV. 761 (1992) (analyzing GRAT dynamics). 
The planning virtue associated with this rule is that the value of the retained interest is often made 
equal to the value of the contributed property, negating any gift tax exposure; however, if the value 
of the trust assets appreciates during the designated time period at a rate greater than the applicable 
federal rate under I.R.C. § 7520, wealth will inure transfer tax-free to the trust beneficiaries. See 
generally Steven J. Arsenault, Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts: After $100 Billion, It’s Time To Solve the 
Great GRAT Caper, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 373 (2015) (explaining how using GRATs erodes the transfer 
tax base); Carlyn S. McCaffrey, Lloyd Leva Plaine & Pam H. Schneider, The Aftermath of Walton: 
The Rehabilitation of the Fixed-Term, Zeroed-Out GRAT, 95 J. TAX’N 325 (2001), 2001 WL 1549325 
(detailing how taxpayers can capitalize upon GRAT usage). 
 11. See generally Karen C. Burke, Exploiting the Medicare Tax Loophole, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 570 
(2018) (discussing, among other things, how taxpayers use S corporations to avoid their employment 
tax obligations); Walter D. Schwidetzky, Integrating Subchapters K and S and Beyond, 18 CHAP. L. 
REV. 93 (2014) (same). 
 12. See, e.g., Linda Sugin, Payroll Taxes, Mythology, and Fairness, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 113, 115 
(2014) (“The payroll tax produces substantial inequity between wage earners and investors with the 
same total income, and the income tax exacerbates that inequity by taxing wage earners more heavily 
in addition to the payroll tax.”); Richard Rubin, Joe Biden Used Tax-Code Loophole Obama Tried To 
Plug, WALL ST. J. (July 10, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/joe-biden-used-tax-code-loophole-
obama-tried-to-plug-11562779300 [https://perma.cc/CN5F-322Y (dark archive)] (“Mr. Biden and his 
wife, Dr. Jill Biden, routed their book and speech income through S corporations, according to tax 
returns the couple released this week. They paid income taxes on those profits, but the strategy let 
the couple avoid the 3.8% self-employment tax . . . .”). 
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are those who can readily afford the expert advice of tax planners and advisers 
trained to navigate the Code’s linguistic hoops and hurdles.13 
The problem of tax abuse in the United States is nothing new. It dates 
back to the Code’s inception, a by-product of taxpayers’ crafty actions and the 
linguistic limitations associated with word usage.14 Traditionally, Congress has 
appeared one step behind the ball, constantly trying to play catch-up and 
dealing with each new instance of tax abuse on a case-by-case basis.15 And, in 
the current Information Age, the problem of tax abuse has gone from bad to 
worse as discussions regarding circumvention techniques travel faster and 
more widely than ever before.16 Moreover, as indicated by past efforts, the 
legislative machinery is typically slow, awkward, and ill-equipped to respond.17 
 
 13. See, e.g., David M. Einhorn, Unintended Advantage: Equity REITS vs. Taxable Real Estate 
Companies, 51 TAX LAW. 203, 217 (1998) (“For many high-income-earning taxpayers, the allure of the 
real estate tax shelter was too strong to resist.”); Stanley A. Koppelman, At-Risk and Passive Activity 
Limitations: Can Complexity Be Reduced?, 45 TAX L. REV. 97, 104 (1989) (“Tax shelters are asserted to 
be both inefficient, in that they cause a misallocation of resources, and inequitable, because tax shelter 
benefits are derived mostly by high income taxpayers.”); Robert J. Peroni, A Policy Critique of the 
Section 469 Passive Loss Rules, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1988) (“Since the passive loss rules do not 
adequately deal with the sources of the tax shelter problem . . . they reduce, but do not eliminate, the 
use of artificial tax losses by high-income taxpayers to avoid paying their fair shares of the federal 
income tax burden.”). 
 14. See Jonathan H. Choi, The Substantive Canons of Tax Law, 72 STAN. L. REV. 195, 209 (2020) 
(“Although the IRS has not followed the judicial trend toward textualism, the apparent tension 
between textualism and anti-abuse doctrines has emboldened tax lawyers to sign off on transactions 
that would have been dubious to purposivists. Thus, textualism’s prominence in scholarly debates 
undermines a key barrier to abusive tax schemes.” (footnotes omitted)); Noël B. Cunningham & 
James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1, 4 (2004) (“Tax shelter promoters 
have exploited the move towards textualism by designing transactions that comply with the letter of 
the law but that generate results clearly never contemplated by Congress or the Treasury.”); Brian 
Galle, Interpretative Theory and Tax Shelter Regulation, 26 VA. TAX REV. 357, 369 (2006) (“[A]s 
textualism has become more prevalent over the past two decades, the [economic substance] doctrine 
has been subjected to ever-increasing skepticism from textualist-minded courts.”); John F. Manning, 
The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 126–29 (describing the recent rise of textualism by 
purposivist judges). 
 15. See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 14, at 6 (arguing that if Congress is left to handle tax 
abuse, it will result “in a hopeless attempt to keep pace with the latest tax gimmick”). 
 16. See, e.g., Michelle Fox, Here Are 5 Ways the Super-Rich Manage To Pay Lower Taxes, CNBC, 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/21/here-are-5-ways-the-super-rich-manage-to-pay-lower-taxes.html 
[https://perma.cc/8JKD-VBS2] (Feb. 22, 2019, 10:02 AM) (explaining tax-saving techniques that 
exploit legislative loopholes). 
 17. See, e.g., Erik M. Jensen, Book Review, 1 COLUM. J. TAX. L. 262, 265 n.10 (2010) 
(reviewing MOSHE SHEKEL, THE TIMING OF INCOME RECOGNITION IN TAX LAW AND THE 
TIME VALUE OF MONEY (2009)) (“One reason that extra-statutory, anti-abuse doctrines developed 
in the U.S. is that Congress can be slow to react.”); Stephanie Hunter McMahon, Political Hot Potato: 
How Closing Loopholes Can Get Policymakers Cooked, 37 J. LEGIS. 142, 142 (2012) (“Congress acted 
only after the federal judiciary and Treasury Department pleaded for congressional reform and, 
receiving none, reduced their roles policing wealthy couples’ tax abuse.”). 
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Furthermore, often hamstrung by its limited authority, the Treasury 
Department’s efforts to curb tax abuse have commonly yielded mixed results.18 
To address the problem of tax abuse head-on, a more encompassing, 
revolutionary reform approach is necessary. Therefore, this Article advocates 
the institution of a broad, general anti-abuse rule. 19  Such a rule, were 
Congress to codify it,20 would sanction the Treasury Department’s ability to 
strategically and timely promulgate regulations whenever a tax-abuse 
technique came to light. If, for any reason, Congress perceived that the 
Treasury Department had overstepped the scope of this broad authority, it 
could respond by crafting legislation that endorsed taxpayer use of the 
particular technique at hand.21 
Utilizing upstream tax planning as a case study, this analysis makes the 
case for granting broad license to the Treasury Department to restrain any and 
all perceived tax abuses. Part I elaborates on why upstream tax planning has 
recently come back into vogue and how taxpayers’ actions are diametrically 
opposed to congressional intent. Part II then analyzes the role that anti-abuse 
provisions have traditionally played in the Code and Treasury Regulations. 
Last, Part III advocates that Congress institute a general anti-abuse rule and 
discusses the likely consequences associated with this legislative initiative. 
 
 18. For example, when trying to issue regulations concerning Code section 385 (pertaining to 
corporate debt and equity identification), the Treasury Department has been met with stiff resistance 
and outcries that it is overstepping its authority. See, e.g., Paul C. Nylen, The Harry Potter Regulations: 
The Magic of the 385 Regulations and the Successor and Predecessor Rules, 18 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 56, 
57–61 (2018) (explaining the long and tortured history of the Treasury Department’s attempts to 
promulgate the section 385 regulations). 
 19. See Frank V. Battle, Jr., The Appropriateness of Anti-Abuse Rules in the U.S. Income Tax System, 
48 TAX LAW. 801, 802 (1995) (explaining that, in general, anti-abuse rules are “designed to prevent a 
taxpayer from achieving a result which is inconsistent with a dominant policy of the law by altering 
the tax consequences which would otherwise have flowed from a transaction, to others more 
consistent with that policy”). 
 20. To a limited extent, Congress has already enacted an anti-abuse rule by codifying the so-
called economic substance doctrine. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-152, § 1409(a), 124 Stat. 1029, 1067–68 (codified at I.R.C. § 7701(o)). However, as tax-abuse 
techniques continue to thrive, they present clear evidence that the formulated statute is too narrow in 
scope, negating its efficacy. See Galle, supra note 14, at 359 (“[C]ourts read the economic substance 
doctrine narrowly, if they are willing to apply it at all.”). 
 21. See Rachelle Holmes Perkins, The Threat of Law: Regulatory Blackmail or an Answer to 
Congressional Inaction?, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 621, 650 (2017) (“Moreover, to the extent that Congress 
more regularly and timely engages in substantive law making, administrative agencies will have fewer 
opportunities to engage in overreaching, quasi-legislative rulemaking.”). In contrast to attacking tax 
loopholes, there is often much political capital to be gained by upbraiding or chastising the IRS and 
the Treasury Department. Miranda Perry Fleischer & Daniel Hemel, The Architecture of a Basic 
Income, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 696 (2020) (“[M]embers of Congress have sought to vilify the IRS 
for a range of alleged infractions and starved the agency of cash.”). 
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I.  CASE STUDY: UPSTREAM TAX PLANNING 
To familiarize readers with the nature of the problem, this Article 
demonstrates how the Code’s rule-based approach cracks open the door to tax 
abuse.22 Section I.A presents a short history of Code sections 1014(a) and 
1014(e) and then summarizes the recent transformation of the nation’s transfer 
tax system. Section II.B outlines the specifics of upstream tax planning and 
the reasons for its popularity. 
A. Background 
Approximately a century ago, out of whole cloth, the Treasury 
Department instituted a rule that the tax basis of an inherited asset would 
equal its fair market value on the date of the decedent’s death.23 Due to the 
rule’s protaxpayer bias, apparently no one objected to its institution; 
additionally, the rule obviated the administrative concern that, in the absence 
of good recordkeeping, accurately identifying the tax basis of a decedent’s 
assets was apt to prove, in many cases, nettlesome or, in other cases, 
impossible.24 For example, the heirs of an estate might have a difficult time 
ascertaining what a decedent dying in 1925 originally paid for stock that the 
decedent had purchased in 1915. 
Following the lead of the Treasury Department, in 1921 Congress 
decided to codify this rule in the predecessor to section 1014(a).25 The statute 
mimicked the Treasury regulation, providing the identical rule, to wit, that 
the tax basis of each inherited asset would equal its fair market value at the 
time of a decedent’s date of death.26 Because assets generally appreciate in 
 
 22. See Linda D. Jellum, Codifying and “Miscodifying” Judicial Anti-Abuse Tax Doctrines, 33 VA. 
TAX REV. 579, 579 (2014) (“The length and complexity of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) is 
largely the result of the U.S. government’s rule-based approach to curtail tax abuse. Taxpayers, aided 
by literalism, have long found and used language in the tax laws to avoid or minimize their tax 
obligations.”); Stanley S. Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the 
Management of Tax Detail, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 673, 703 (1969) (recommending “a gradual 
shift from a highly detailed statute to more generalized provisions”). 
 23. Treas. Reg. 45, § 202, art. 1562 (1919). The term “tax basis” represents the capital 
investment a taxpayer has in an asset which the Code then uses in a number of settings (e.g., 
computing depreciation, amortization, depletion, and casualty losses), but primarily as a mechanism 
to eliminate the potential for double taxation. See id. § 214(a)(4)–(6), (8)–(10). 
 24. See ZELENAK, supra note 5, at 96–99 (explaining the origins of this rule and why, for the 
past century, Congress has chosen to retain Code section 1014). 
 25. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 202(a)(3), 42 Stat. 227, 229 (codified at 26 
U.S.C. § 954(b)(11) (1925)). 
 26. Actually, in determining an inherited asset’s basis, the original statute referred to the value 
“at the time of . . . acquisition.” Id. The U.S. Supreme Court construed this language to mean the 
decedent’s date of death rather than the date that an executor distributed such property. Brewster v. 
Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 335 (1930). Later, in 1934, Congress amended the statute to reference a 
decedent’s date of death. Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, § 113(a)(5), 48 Stat. 680, 706 
(codified as amended in 26 I.R.C. § 1014). 
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value over time, the government would stand to lose a vast amount of revenue 
on its failure to tax the gain that accrued between the time a decedent 
purchased an asset and the time its basis resets to fair market value upon death 
per 1014(a).27 However, Congress apparently deemed this to be a worthwhile 
price to pay for the administrative convenience of eliminating the need for 
taxpayers to undertake challenging basis identifications of assets that 
decedents had purchased years or decades earlier.28 
But, in due course, some taxpayers decided to take advantage of 
Congress’s magnanimous approach to tax basis identifications, marking the 
first appearance of upstream tax planning whereby, in a prototypical situation, 
a younger generation member gifts assets to an older generation family 
member. Although it sounds a bit ghoulish, these taxpayers would strategically 
transfer appreciated assets to very sick and dying older relatives or loved ones 
with the expectation of quickly receiving such assets back with a higher tax 
basis in the form of inheritances.29 For example, a child might transfer the 
title of his farm with a tax basis of $100,000 and fair market value of $500,000 
to his cancer-ridden, widowed mother with the hope that if she perished soon, 
he would receive title back to the farm with a $500,000 tax basis, thereby 
erasing the $400,000 embedded gain (in other words, $500,000 fair market 
value less $100,000 basis).30 
As expected, Congress was slow to respond to this tax-abuse technique. 
It waited sixty years before instituting section 1014(e) in 1981, 31  which 
provides that if a taxpayer transfers title to an asset to another taxpayer, the 
latter taxpayer dies within one year, and asset ownership returns to the 
original taxpayer, then no tax basis adjustment is to be made.32 To illustrate, 
in the prior example, if the mother died within one year of receiving title to 
the farm and she bequeathed the farm back to her son, the farm’s tax basis 
would remain at $100,000 in the son’s hands. 
 
 27. By way of example, assume a taxpayer purchases an asset in 2021 for $10,000 and by 2023, it 
appreciates to $13,000 and is then sold. The taxpayer must pay tax on this $3,000 gain ($13,000 less 
$10,000). 
 28. See, e.g., Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Death Without Taxes?, 20 VA. TAX 
REV. 499, 529 (2001) [hereinafter Burke & McCouch, Death Without Taxes?] (“Nevertheless, as a 
matter of political expediency and administrative convenience, a general exemption [embodied in 
section 1014(a)] may be necessary to ameliorate the problems of proving basis.”). 
 29. See, e.g., Peter S. Cremer, The 1981 Act and Section 2035: Problems and Possibilities, 35 TAX 
LAW. 389, 401 (1982) (“In the absence of [section 1014(e)], a deathbed transfer between spouses in 
any amount or between others in the amount of the unified credit equivalent could result in a transfer 
tax-free purchase of basis.”). 
 30. See I.R.C. § 1014(a). 
 31. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 425(a), 95 Stat. 172, 318 
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1014(e)). 
 32. Id. 
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In enacting section 1014(e), Congress thought that it had put the brakes 
on the macabre tax-planning practice of the sort described above. And, for a 
while, it did. When Congress instituted section 1014(e), the country had a 
somewhat vibrant transfer tax system. More specifically, taxpayers could 
transfer tax-free up to $600,000 via their lifetime-exemption amount, during 
their lifetime or upon death.33 But if they exceeded this threshold, the nation’s 
transfer tax, with rates extending as high as seventy-seven percent, would then 
apply. 34  The vigor of the nation’s transfer tax system, combined with 
section 1014(e), had a tremendous chilling effect upon taxpayers considering 
upstream tax planning. In particular, most taxpayers would not have wanted 
to risk losing part of their lifetime exemption amount if this ploy failed (for 
example, if the recipient died within one year). Furthermore, transferring 
valuable property to the aged and infirm might trigger unanticipated transfer 
tax exposure if the aggregate value of the transferred assets combined with the 
recipient’s other assets exceeded the recipient’s lifetime-exemption amount. 
To illustrate this point using the prior example, if the child transferred the 
$100,000 farm to his mother and the value of his mother’s estate thereby 
exceeded the estate tax threshold for taxability, the associated estate tax 
liability would negate the attractiveness of upstream tax planning. 
But over the last two decades, Congress has rendered the nation’s 
transfer tax system largely ineffectual. 35  Evidence for this proposition is 
twofold. First, Congress reduced the highest transfer tax rate to a flat forty 
 
 33. Here is a dynamic illustration of how the lifetime exemption operates both while the 
taxpayer is living and upon death. Assume a taxpayer has a net worth of $1 million and the lifetime 
exemption amount is $600,000. Consider two scenarios: 
(1) The taxpayer makes no lifetime gift and she dies. In this case, her taxable estate would 
be $400,000 (the $1 million net worth less the $600,000 lifetime exemption) upon which an 
estate tax would be levied. 
(2) The taxpayer makes a $200,000 taxable gift, leaving a balance of $400,000 of her 
lifetime exemption amount available (the $600,000 lifetime exemption less the $200,000 
gift) and a net worth of $800,000 (the $1 million net worth less the $200,000 gift). If she 
then dies, her taxable estate would be $400,000 (the remaining net worth of $800,000 less 
the $400,000 remaining lifetime exemption) upon which an estate tax would be levied. 
 34. See generally Darien B. Jacobson, Brian G. Raub & Barry W. Johnson, The Estate Tax: 
Ninety  Years and Counting, STATS. OF INCOME BULL., Summer 2007, at 118, 122 fig.D, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/07sumbul.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MPX-JPEU] (detailing the history 
of the estate tax, the available exemption, and its rate structure). 
 35. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 
§§ 511(a), 521(b), 115 Stat. 38, 70–71 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 2001(c)(1), 2010(c)) (raising 
the estate tax exemption and lowering estate tax rates); Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance 
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 302(a), 124 Stat. 3296, 3301 
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 2010(c)) (further raising the estate tax exemption); Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11061(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2091 (codified as amended at I.R.C. 
§ 2010(c)(3)) (same). 
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percent,36 much lower than it has been throughout most of its hundred-plus-
year history.37 Second, the lifetime exemption amount is presently set at $11.7 
million,38 a dollar figure far more generous than preceding figures,39 even after 
the latter are adjusted for inflation.40 For the vast majority of the nation’s 
taxpayers, the combination of a lower tax rate and a much higher lifetime 
exemption amount has turned the nation’s transfer tax system into a paper 
tiger. No longer feared, the nation’s transfer tax system has become feeble, 
and this has had the unintended consequence of resurrecting upstream tax 
planning. 
B. The Popularity of Upstream Tax Planning 
In the aftermath of the vast changes that the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 
201741 made to the transfer tax system,42 members of the estate planning bar 
have decided that taxpayers should shift their focus. Rather than 
concentrating on transfer tax minimization (particularly since 99.9% of 
taxpayers no longer have transfer tax exposure),43 the bar has placed a renewed 
emphasis on income tax minimization and, in particular, maximization of the 
tax basis that heirs have in their inherited assets.44 
There are several tax-basis-maximization strategies that the estate 
planning bar has coaxed taxpayers to consider. Such strategies include, but are 
not limited to, (a) retaining, rather than gifting, appreciated assets;45 (b) using 
high date-of-death valuations; 46  and (c) moving to community property 
states.47 
 
 36. I.R.C. § 2001(c). 
 37. See Jacobson et al., supra note 34, at 122 fig.D. 
 38. The 2021 estate tax exemption amount was $11,700,000. Rev. Proc. 2020-45, § 3.41, 2020-46 
I.R.B. 998, 1024. 
 39. See Jacobson et al., supra note 34, at 122 fig.D. 
 40. See generally Jay A. Soled, The Federal Estate Tax Exemption and the Need for Its Reduction, 47 
FLA. ST. L. REV. 649, 659 (2020) (“The aftermath of this series of legislative changes can be distilled 
down to one salient observation: even after taking inflation into account, the size of the estate tax 
exemption amount has ballooned relative to the size it has been historically.”). 
 41. Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (codified in scattered sections of the I.R.C.). 
 42. Id. § 11061, 131 Stat. 2054, 2091 (doubling the estate tax exemption amount). 
 43. See Sasha A. Klein & Mark R. Parthemer, The New Tax Law: It’s Déjà Vu All Over Again, 
PROB. & PROP., Mar./Apr. 2018, at 40, 43 (“In fact, it is estimated that the number of taxable estates 
will drop from around 5,000 in 2017 to fewer than 1,800 in 2018. Said another way, there will be 
fewer than 36 taxable estates per state in 2018.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Griffin H. Bridgers, Basis Step-Up Planning: A Double-Edged Sword: A Review of 
Common State Law Nuances, PROB. & PROP., July/Aug. 2018, at 24, 24 (“One of the biggest modern 
goals of tax planning now is maximizing the opportunity to obtain a step-up in income tax basis for 
family assets at least at the death of the client. The recent doubling of the estate tax applicable 
exclusion amount is certain to increase this type of planning.”). 
 45. See I.R.C. § 1015(a) (requiring a carryover tax basis in the gift-giving context). 
 46. MICKEY R. DAVIS & MELISSA J. WILLMS, ALL ABOUT THAT BASIS: HOW INCOME 
TAXES HAVE RESHAPED ESTATE PLANNING 1 (2019), http://daviswillms.com/yahoo_site_admin/ 
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Upstream planning is an additional tax-basis-maximization strategy that 
has gained renewed traction. 48 As explained above, this strategy is fairly 
straightforward: a taxpayer, say, a son, gifts appreciated property (such as the 
title to an appreciated farm) to another taxpayer, say, his mother; the son 
patiently waits for his mother to die; and the mother bequeaths the original 
property back to the son. 
This seemingly straightforward strategy is, however, fraught with 
logistical concerns. The mother could enter a nursing home, exposing the 
gifted asset to the risk of being sold and the proceeds used to meet her 
medical needs. Alternatively, the mother could meet the next Don Juan, who 
sweeps her off her feet and convinces her to leave her entire estate to him. A 
final possible scenario is that the mother develops misgivings about her son 
and decides to bequeath the gifted property to her other children, if any, or a 
favorite charity. Indeed, gifting assets outright to a loved one who is sick or 
dying is fraught with risk. Many taxpayers harbor deep misgivings about 
using this tactic precisely because the risks associated with outright gifts are so 
grave. 
In recognition of these risks, the estate planning bar has been proactive 
in developing mechanisms that attempt to ensure return of the appreciated 
asset to its original owner, the owner’s spouse, or the owner’s offspring.49 In 
lieu of making outright gifts, the bar is therefore instructing taxpayers (such as 
the son in the example above) to establish prophylactic trusts for the benefit 
of their loved ones (such as the mother in the example above). The terms of 
such trusts grant to the trust beneficiary (the mother) what the Code defines 
 
assets/docs/davis_willms_basis_2019.89191738.pdf [https://perma.cc/43MF-S59U]. With estate tax 
exemption at a historically high level, the tendency now for many taxpayers is to seek a high date-of-
death valuation. Id. In years past, the common practice was to try to minimize asset values. See, e.g., 
William S. Blatt, Minority Discounts, Fair Market Value, and the Culture of Estate Taxation, 52 TAX L. 
REV. 225, 225 (1997) (“The allowance of minority discounts encourages transactions designed to 
reduce transfer taxes.”); Joseph M. Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-to-Value Lines, 
43 TAX L. REV. 241, 244 (1988) (“[V]irtually all of the transfer tax loopholes involve undervaluation 
of gratuitous transfers with the blessing of existing law.”); James R. Repetti, Minority Discounts: The 
Alchemy in Estate and Gift Taxation, 50 TAX L. REV. 415, 416 (1995) (“A common tool of estate 
planning involves the purposeful diminution in value of family property in order to reduce estate and 
gift taxes.”). 
 47. See I.R.C. § 1014(b)(6) (permitting the tax basis of both the decedent’s and their spouse’s 
assets to equal fair market value under community property law). See generally Paul L. Caron & Jay 
A. Soled, New Prominence of Tax Basis in Estate Planning, 150 TAX NOTES 1569, 1572 (2016) (“To 
maximize the advantage of section 1014(b)(6), married couples should transform as much common 
law property as possible into community property.”). 
 48. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 49. See DAVIS & WILLMS, supra note 46, at 31–35 (describing the virtues of a so-called 
“Accidentally Perfect Grantor Trust,” which capitalizes upon upstream planning while seeking to 
ensure the return of gifted property). 
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as a general power of appointment. 50  To exercise a general power of 
appointment, however, invariably requires the retention of knowledgeable 
legal counsel, and thus the actual exercise power is apt to remain inactive.51 
Nevertheless, because the potency of control a general power of appointment 
affords its holders, its mere presence causes the assets in such a trust to be 
included in the power holder’s estate (namely, that of the mother), triggering 
the application of step-up in basis rule applicable to all of the trust’s assets.52 
With respect to these appreciated assets, taxpayers engaging in upstream tax 
planning can thus defeat their income tax obligations, while the elderly and 
infirm act as passive shills. The loser in this arrangement is not the taxpayer, 
the tax adviser, or the sick/elderly family member; instead, it is the 
government, which stands to lose significant tax dollars on the embedded 
gains that upstream planning erases. 
Analyzing upstream tax planning leads to several important observations 
about tax avoidance. First and foremost is that planning of this sort directly 
contravenes congressional intent. It seems clear that Congress has chosen to 
retain section 1014 to alleviate the need for tax-basis identifications. 53 
Historically, securing this information was deemed too nettlesome or 
impossible to obtain.54 In the case of upstream tax planning, however, all of 
the involved parties know with specificity the tax basis of the asset being 
transferred; and to augment it, they undertake a series of contrived transfers. 
Second, upstream tax-planning gifting is driven by pure tax avoidance, not 
detached and disinterested generosity to the elderly and infirm.55 Finally, 
notwithstanding the fact that upstream tax planning is abusive, it is still 
lawful. As such, the IRS lacks any meaningful ability to judicially challenge 
 
 50. See I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1) (defining a general power of appointment to mean “a power which is 
exercisable in favor of the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate”). 
 51. The scope of this general power of appointment is often limited to the creditors of the 
decedent’s estate. Why? To further limit its potential of being exercised. See Elizabeth L. Pack, 
Income Tax Planning Strategies for Estate Plans Under the TCJA, EST. PLAN., Feb. 2019, at 19, 20 
(“Th[e] risk [of the older generation member directing the trust assets to unintended beneficiaries] 
can be reduced, but not eliminated, by granting [such person] only a narrow testamentary general 
power of appointment, so that, for example, the permissible appointees consist of only the [person’s] 
creditors . . . .”). 
 52. See I.R.C. § 1014(a)–(b) (providing that the basis-equal-to-fair-market-value rule is 
applicable for any asset includable in a decedent’s gross estate). 
 53. See ZELENAK, supra note 5, at 110–32 (2018) (explaining why, for the past century, Congress 
has chosen to retain section 1014). 
 54. See Burke & McCouch, Death Without Taxes?, supra note 28, at 528. 
 55. See Cremer, supra note 29, at 401–02 (“Unless the donee spouse will certainly die within a 
year, a transfer of property returning to the donor spouse may well be worth making to purchase a 
stepped-up basis.”); Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (holding that for a gift to be 
bona fide, it must spring from “detached and disinterested generosity”). 
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taxpayers’ actions, so the agency’s only recourse is to prod Congress to enact 
remedial legislation.56 
II.  ANALYSIS 
With over a century of experience with section 1014 under its belt,57 
Congress is not oblivious to incidences of tax abuse. In terms of upstream tax 
planning, Congress undoubtedly recognizes that this is not an isolated 
incident of tax abuse. Indeed, there are numerous forms of tax abuse that 
share common traits with upstream tax planning, each having a corrosive 
effect on overall tax compliance and, as a whole, costing billions of dollars 
annually in lost tax revenue.58 
Thus, Congress remains vigilant. On multiple occasions, Congress and 
the Treasury Department have taken important steps to address and curtail 
various tax-abuse techniques brought to its attention.59 However, these actions 
have been less than successful. Below, Section II.A details these vigilant 
efforts, and Section II.B explains why such efforts have often fallen short of 
meeting their intended goals. 
 
 56. See, e.g., Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a 
Silver Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1952 (2005) (arguing the need for a statutory solution to the 
corporate tax shelter problem, which would disallow noneconomic losses); McMahon, supra note 17, 
at 152–53 (“[W]ithin the constraints of the statute, the Treasury Department troubleshot problems of 
tax avoidance as it lobbied Congress to legislate a change to alleviate this burden.”). 
 57. Congress instituted the income tax system in 1913, Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 
§ 2, 38 Stat. 114, 166–81, and the estate tax in 1916, Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, 
§§ 200–212, 39 Stat. 756, 777–80. 
 58. See, e.g., Matthew C. Klein, How Much Do Tax Havens Cost the Rest of Us?, BARRON’S (June 
19, 2018, 10:58 AM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/how-much-do-tax-havens-cost-the-rest-of-us-
1529420282 [http://perma.cc/Q5PS-ZRK8] (estimating that billions of tax dollars go unpaid annually 
because of the use of aggressive tax strategies, namely corporate tax havens); David J. Herzig, Am I 
the Only Person Paying Taxes?: The Largest Tax Loophole for the Rich—Exchange Funds, 2009 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 503, 540. 
The underlying fact that must finally be accepted is that exchange funds exist only for 
the purpose of avoiding taxation. Every part of the exchange fund is designed around a 
specific rule. The term of the fund, set at seven years, is designed to avoid 
Section 704(c)(1)(B). The 80%–20% asset breakdown exists only to avoid the investment 
company rules under Sections 351 or 721. The 20% illiquid security is specifically engineered 
for the fund to satisfy the tax code. 
Id. 
 59. See, e.g., Education Jobs and Medicaid Funding Bill, Pub. L. No. 111-226, § 211, 124 Stat. 
2389, 2394–96 (2010) (codified as amended at I.R.C § 909) (introducing Code section 909 and 
closing several foreign tax credit loopholes, including preventing the separation of creditable foreign 
taxes from the associated foreign income). 
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A. Efforts of Congress and the Treasury Department To Curb Incidences of Tax 
Abuse 
When enacting tax legislation, Congress is mindful that if it delves too 
deeply into legislative minutiae it will be accused of micromanaging and being 
overly intrusive. Instead, by presenting a general framework, it hopes that 
taxpayers will be fully compliant and will orchestrate their affairs to adhere to 
both the letter and spirit of the Code. To the extent that taxpayers fulfill this 
goal, neither Congress nor the Treasury Department needs to take any further 
action. Not only will the revenue targets associated with the legislative 
landscape be met, but also taxpayers and their advisers can concentrate on 
meeting nontax-related economic objectives. 
But, inevitably, not all taxpayers fall into line. Some instead seek to 
circumvent their tax obligations, endeavoring to avert their financial burdens. 
Consider several examples: 
• During the 1970s and 1980s, in an attempt to secure large 
noneconomic tax depreciation and amortization deductions, 
taxpayers used nonrecourse debt instruments to purchase tangible 
and intangible equipment and other property from promoters at 
greatly inflated prices.60 
• During the 1990s, in order to manufacture large noneconomic 
losses, taxpayers invested in tax shelters that artificially produced 
augmented tax bases in their investments.61 
• Beginning in the 2000s, taxpayers established grantor-retained 
annuity trusts (“GRAT”), enabling them to transfer vast amounts 
of wealth to beneficiaries, free of any gift tax.62 
 
 60. See, e.g., Sandra L. DeGraw, Retributive Justice for Tax Shelter Investors: The Tax Reform 
P.A.L., 61 TEMP. L. REV. 51, 53 n.7 (1988) (presenting a comprehensive overview of the nature of 
the tax shelters that dominated during the 1970s and 1980s). 
For example, a taxpayer purchases an abandoned building with a $100,000 fair market value for 
$1 million, paying the entire purchase price from funds borrowed from the seller and secured by a 
nonrecourse mortgage on the building (meaning that there is no personal liability for taxpayer’s 
failure to pay). Going forward, the taxpayer can take enormous depreciation deductions. 
 61. See, e.g., Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, COBRA Strikes Back: Anatomy of a Tax 
Shelter, 62 TAX LAW. 59, 59 (2008) (“In essence, [the basic shelter transaction] uses offsetting 
options to inflate the basis of property that is distributed by a partnership and then contributed to 
and sold by another partnership, resulting in a large tax loss without any corresponding economic 
loss.”). 
For example, a taxpayer sells an option to acquire securities (short sale), simultaneously 
purchases a similar one (long sale), contributes both to a partnership, and claims a high basis therein 
on the theory that the liability on the first leg of the transaction was to be ignored due to its 
contingent nature while the second leg of the transaction was to be respected. 
 62. See, e.g., McCaffrey et al., supra note 10, at 325 (“The GRAT is an attractive planning 
device because it can facilitate the transfer of substantial wealth at little or no gift tax cost without 
using a significant portion of the transferor’s gift tax exemption.”). 
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• Because numerous states have either repealed or eviscerated their 
rule against perpetuities, 63  taxpayers now routinely establish 
dynasty trusts specifically designed to skirt the congressional goal 
that the wealth of high-net-worth taxpayers endures transfer tax at 
least once at every generational level.64 
These and a plethora of other examples reveal several salient traits 
associated with tax-abuse techniques. 65  In some instances, these abuses 
flourish because taxpayers (in cooperation with attorneys and promoters) are 
willing to commit what is tantamount to fraud.66 In other instances, tax-abuse 
techniques flourish because taxpayers skillfully utilize the Code’s written 
words in a highly technical fashion as strategic tools to defend against tax 
imposition.67 And still in other cases, knowing that sets of laws often lack 
coordination, taxpayers lobby for changes in one set of laws that ameliorate 
their tax burdens related to another set of laws.68 
Regardless, it is evident that Congress did not anticipate the tax-abuse 
technique in question. Indeed, had Congress known in advance how taxpayers 
would react, it would have certainly taken more comprehensive and protective 
measures to secure tax outcomes in line with its intended goals and objectives. 
 
For example, a taxpayer establishes a two-year trust by contributing $1 million dollars, yet 
retains an annual annuity right of $524,000. The retention of such a right negates the value of the 
remainder interest. However, if the value of the property appreciates in excess of the Code 
section 7520 rate, wealth will inure transfer tax-free to the remaining beneficiaries. 
 63. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, States’ Repeal of Rule Against Perpetuities Creates US 
Aristocracy, Law Prof Says, ABA J. (July 12, 2010, 3:30 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ 
states_repeal_of_rule_against_perpetuities_creatomg_us_aristocracy_law_prof [http://perma.cc/T79L 
-CGKY] (“In the mid-1990s, however, many states eliminated the rule [against perpetuities] with the 
aim of attracting business, a goal encouraged by banking lobbyists.”). For example, a taxpayer 
establishes a testamentary trust with a 1,000-year term that provides income interests for her 
offspring, and upon their demise, passes to the next generation and onward and so forth. 
 64. See, e.g., Grayson M.P. McCouch, Who Killed the Rule Against Perpetuities?, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 
1291, 1291–93 (2013) (describing why many states have chosen to eliminate their rule against 
perpetuities and the rise of the perpetual trust market). 
 65. This Article refers to large-scale, rather than isolated, instances of tax abuse (such as one 
taxpayer’s failure to report cash receipts). 
 66. See, e.g., Paul Braverman, Helter Shelter, AM. LAW., Dec. 2003, at 65, 66, 
https://lfdslaw.com/downloads/American_Lawyer_Dec_2003.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3TB-UKYN] 
(describing the fraudulent practices of the tax shelter industry). 
 67. See, e.g., Janet Novack, The Hustling of Rated Shelters, FORBES (Dec. 14, 1998, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/forbes/1998/1214/6213198a.html#20fce7e771db [http://perma.cc/G83X-
FKLL] (“Today’s shelter hustlers parse the numerous weaknesses in the tax code and devise schemes 
that can be pitched as ‘products’ to corporate prospects. Then they sell them methodically and 
aggressively, using a powerful distribution network not unlike the armies of pitchmen who sold cattle 
and railcar tax shelters to individuals in the 1970s and 1980s.”). 
 68. See, e.g., Mark J. Mazur, Luck and Tax Policy, 44 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 103, 107–08 (2018) 
(“Sometimes, steps intended to result in basic reform may have unintended consequences and 
perhaps move the tax system in the wrong direction.”). 
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When a particular tax-abuse technique becomes especially egregious and 
widespread, one of the following three responses is commonplace: (1) 
Congress reforms the Code; (2) Congress authorizes the Treasury 
Department to promulgate new regulations to curb the particular kind of tax-
abuse technique; or (3) the Treasury Department, on its own initiative, 
promulgates regulations to safeguard the tax base. 
1.  Congress Reforms the Code 
Tax laws are commonly scored for their revenue consequences.69 Some 
tax laws are specifically intended to generate additional revenue (for example, 
eliminating business entertainment expense deductions),70 while other tax laws 
come with the “price tag” of reducing revenue yields (for example, shortening 
the class life of property for depreciation deduction purposes). 71  Other 
statutory provisions—such as allowing the deduction of interest paid on 
qualified home purchases72—are known in tax parlance as tax expenditures73 
and constitute indirect government subsidies rather than direct cash outlays.74 
To maintain fiscal solvency, Congress seeks to ensure that its revenue 
projections are met and that its outlays, including those pertaining to tax 
expenditures, are in line. 
When it becomes clear that taxpayers are engaging in particular forms of 
tax abuse, Congress can take legislative measures to restore financial 
equilibrium.75 On Capitol Hill, this is a regular occurrence.76 Rather than 
 
 69. See generally Emil M. Sunley & Randall D. Weiss, The Revenue Estimating Process, 10 AM. J. 
TAX POL’Y 261, 261–62 (1992) (“Although revenue estimates do not represent a complete economic 
analysis of a tax proposal, they provide useful information to those evaluating the desirability of the 
proposal.”). 
 70. I.R.C. § 274(a). 
 71. Id. § 168(a), (e). 
 72. Id. § 163(h)(2)–(3). 
 73. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 3, 88 Stat. 297, 
299 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 622(3)) (defining “tax expenditures” as “revenue losses 
attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or 
deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral 
of tax liability”). For a list of expenditure estimates, see STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 115-
JCX-81-18, ESTIMATES FOR FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018–2022, at 20–
40 (2018). 
 74. Bernard Wolfman, Tax Expenditures: From Idea to Ideology, 99 HARV. L. REV. 491, 491–92 
(1985) (book review) (“The concept of a tax expenditure . . . is based upon recognition of the fact that 
a government can appropriate money to a particular person or group by using a special, narrowly 
directed tax deduction or exclusion, instead of by using its ordinary direct spending mechanisms.”). 
 75. Consider two examples. First, for decades, taxpayers used their passive investments to 
manufacture losses and, in response, Congress enacted Code section 469. Robert J. Peroni, A Policy 
Critique of the Section 469 Passive Loss Rules, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1988) (“[S]ection 469 attempts 
to eliminate, or at least substantially reduce, the attractiveness of tax shelters by preventing taxpayers 
from using their net losses from passive activities to offset or ‘shelter’ their income from wages, 
trades or businesses in which the taxpayer materially participates, or portfolio investments (such as 
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summarize a myriad of such initiatives, consider the case of hidden offshore 
accounts and how they ultimately led to the passage of the Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”).77 
When the global economy was in its nascent stages of development, 
many taxpayers sought refuge from paying their taxes by parking their 
investments in offshore accounts.78 These taxpayers were confident that the 
bank secrecy laws of Switzerland and other countries (such as the Philippines 
or Liechtenstein) would safeguard their earnings from the prying eyes of the 
IRS.79 And for decades, taxpayers were correct in their assumptions; their 
abuse of the Code—in particular, ignoring explicit disclosure requirements on 
the face of their federal income tax returns—was generally met with 
impunity.80 
Information gradually trickled into the Treasury Department and to 
Congress that taxpayer noncompliance regarding offshore reporting was 
rampant.81 The IRS’s only recourse to fulfill its oversight mission was to 
dedicate more of its limited resources to the near-impossible task of learning 
 
dividends and interest).”). Second, in the aftermath of highly publicized tax shelters, Congress 
enacted a reporting requirement for all so-called reportable transactions. See I.R.C. § 6707A(c)(1) 
(defining “reportable transaction” as “any transaction with respect to which information is required to 
be included with a return or statement because, as determined under regulations prescribed under 
section 6011, such transaction is of a type which the Secretary determines as having a potential for tax 
avoidance or evasion”). 
 76. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 306(a)(1)(A), (c)(1)(A) (declaring that the disposition of preferred stock 
received tax-free under Code section 305(a) can give rise to the receipt of ordinary income). This 
provision overturned the strategy that taxpayers employed to convert ordinary income into capital 
gains. See id.; see also, e.g., Chamberlin v. Comm’r, 207 F.2d 462, 463–65, 468–70 (6th Cir. 1953). 
 77. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act (Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act), 
Pub. L. No. 111-147, §§ 501–541, 124 Stat. 71, 97–117 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 78. See Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance: Hearing Before the S. Permanent Subcomm. on 
Investigations, of the Comm. On Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affs., 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of Carl 
Levin, Senator). (estimating that the United States loses about $100 billion of tax revenue from 
hidden offshore accounts). See generally STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON 
INVESTIGATIONS, 109TH CONG., REP. ON TAX HAVEN ABUSES: THE ENABLERS, THE TOOLS 
AND SECRECY (2006) (describing the offshore industry and giving its related case history). 
 79. See, e.g., Ray Flores, Lifting Bank Secrecy: A Comparative Look at the Philippines, Switzerland, 
and Global Transparency, 14 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 779, 779–81 (2015) (examining the bank 
secrecy laws of both the Philippines and Switzerland); Scott A. Schumacher, Magnifying Deterrence by 
Prosecuting Professionals, 89 IND. L.J. 511, 524 (2014) (“Until very recently, Liechtenstein also had 
strict bank secrecy laws, which caused it to be described as ‘the most dangerous tax haven in 
Europe.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 80. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Tax Cheats Called Out of Control, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/01/business/01tax.html [https://perma.cc/R3JV-LDBE (dark 
archive)] (“So many superrich Americans evade taxes using offshore accounts that law enforcement 
cannot control the growing misconduct, according to a Senate report that provides the most detailed 
look ever at high-level tax schemes.”). 
 81. See generally Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, Leak-Driven Law, 65 UCLA L. REV. 532 (2018) 
(explaining how leaked data can be used to create and enforce tax law for policy outcomes). 
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about such secret accounts and prosecuting those who availed themselves of 
this strategy. 82  This painstaking endeavor, though, yielded few tangible 
benefits.83 
Due to a host of factors, such as the introduction of a comprehensive 
whistleblower law that offered more robust financial rewards for reporting tax 
noncompliance, 84  information-sharing arrangements between and among 
countries,85 and the digitalization of information,86 the once-hermetic seal of 
secrecy surrounding offshore bank accounts went by the wayside. Consider 
the consequences when Bradley C. Birkenfeld, an employee at UBS (a Swiss 
Bank) in search of a whistleblower award, came forward with a treasure trove 
of information regarding the Swiss banking system.87 He divulged that his 
employer had devised schemes to attract U.S. investors and coached them on 
available methodologies to circumvent their tax obligations.88 In addition, 
Birkenfeld turned over the account information of nearly 50,000 U.S. 
taxpayers who had secret overseas accounts.89 For his efforts and in accordance 
 
 82. See Khrista McCarden, Till Offshore Do Us Part: Uncovering Assets Hidden from Spouses and 
Tax Authorities, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 19, 20 (2017) (“[T]he Internal Revenue Service (‘IRS’) does not 
have the time or resources to untangle the intricate maze of corporate structures used by wealthy 
individuals to hide their assets offshore.”). 
 83. See Giant Leak of Offshore Financial Records Exposes Global Array of Crime and Corruption, 
INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Apr. 3, 2016), https://panamapapers.icij.org/ 
20160403-panama-papers-global-overview.html [https://perma.cc/9LWE-YQFK] (describing the 
“Panama Papers” as a “cache of 11.5 million records [that] shows how a global industry of law firms 
and big banks sells financial secrecy to politicians, fraudsters and drug traffickers as well as 
billionaires, celebrities and sports stars”). 
 84. I.R.C. § 7623(b). 
 85. See, e.g., Itai Grinberg, The New International Tax Diplomacy, 104 GEO. L.J. 1137, 1164 (2016) 
(“The [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development] then advances specific enhanced 
models of information-sharing among tax administrations that delineate aggressive tax-planning 
arrangements, so as to encourage effective cross-border administrative assistance regarding these 
arrangements.”). 
 86. See, e.g., Zachary Rozen, Symposium Review: Leakers, Whistleblowers & Traitors, 8 J. NAT’L 
SEC. L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2015) (“Recently, mass data storage, the digitalization of information, and the 
sheer size of the modern national security apparatus have made it far easier for government 
employees to share classified information without appropriate authorization.”). 
 87. See Jennifer M. Pacella, Bounties for Bad Behavior: Rewarding Culpable Whistleblowers Under 
the Dodd-Frank Act and Internal Revenue Code, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 345, 345 (2015) (“In 2012, Bradley 
Birkenfeld received a $104 million bounty reward from the Internal Revenue Service (‘IRS’) for 
blowing the whistle on his employer, UBS, which facilitated a major offshore tax fraud scheme.”). 
 88. See Bradley Klapper, Senate: UBS Aided Tax Cheats, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/ 
id/25834785 [https://perma.cc/73F5-AEEK] (Aug. 5, 2010, 1:08 PM) (explaining how UBS and other 
Swiss banks conspired to assist U.S. taxpayers to shortchange the federal government of tax revenue). 
 89. Marc D. Shepsman, Comment, Buying FATCA Compliance: Overcoming Holdout Incentives To 
Prevent International Tax Arbitrage, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1767, 1790 (2013) (“While Birkenfeld 
tipped off the United States to the existence of nearly 50,000 US accounts, the Swiss handed over 
just 4,500 after a heated legal battle.”). 
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with the whistleblower laws at that time, the Treasury Department awarded 
Birkenfeld the sum of $104 million, the largest award of its kind ever issued.90 
Birkenfeld’s and others’ revelations regarding the vastness of taxpayers’ 
failure to report their overseas income stirred Congress into action. The 
nation’s legislative body could no longer blithely pretend that hidden offshore 
accounts were tactics used by a very small number of rogue taxpayers. 
Theoretically, Congress could have augmented the IRS’s budget and prodded 
the Commissioner to concentrate on promoting international tax compliance, 
but these efforts likely would have produced few tangible benefits and would 
have come at a steep, resource-devouring price tag. Congress knew that if it 
did not take more significant measures, the very integrity of the tax system 
was at risk. 
Therefore, Congress enacted FATCA 91  as an instrument to target 
offshore tax evasion. FACTA requires foreign financial institutions that 
operate in the United States to deliver to the IRS account information 
regarding U.S. taxpayers or face burdensome U.S. withholding taxes on their 
U.S.-sourced income.92 In accordance with FATCA, information sharing with 
the United States has become commonplace;93 and this measure, along with 
others,94 has proven highly effective in safeguarding the tax base from erosion 
due to the failures of taxpayers to report their offshore investments.95 
 
 90. See David Kocieniewski, Whistle-Blower Awarded $104 Million by I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/business/whistle-blower-awarded-104-million-
by-irs.html [https://perma.cc/YB27-8HV2 (dark archive)] (describing Birkenfeld’s whistleblowing 
efforts). 
 91. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text. 
 92. See supra notes 75–82 and accompanying text; Remy Farag, Deloitte: FATCA Compliance May 
Proliferate via Peer Pressure, 23 J. INT’L TAX’N 6, 6 (2012) (“Under these provisions, a withholding 
agent must deduct and withhold a tax equal to 30% of any withholdable payment made to a 
nonfinancial foreign entity if the beneficial owner of the payment is a nonfinancial foreign entity that 
does not meet specified requirements ([I.R.C. §] 1472(a)).”). 
 93. Multiple countries have entered into agreements with the United States to share 
information under FATCA. For a list of FATCA agreements and understandings in effect by 
jurisdiction. See Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://www 
.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx [https://perma.cc/W7PN-GXHY]. 
 94. The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (“OECD”) has developed 
a “Common Reporting Standards” (“CRS”) framework based in large part on the FATCA model. See 
generally ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPPERATIVE & DEV., STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC 
EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT INFORMATION IN TAX MATTERS (2d ed. 2017) (explaining 
the common due diligence procedures to be followed by financial institutions under CRS). Under the 
CRS framework, financial institutions share information with tax authorities, and the tax authorities 
share information with one another. Id. More than 100 jurisdictions have adopted binding CRS 
instruments. See, e.g., CRS by Jurisdiction 2020, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-
exchange/crs-implementation-and-assistance/crs-by-jurisdiction/crs-by-jurisdiction-2020.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Z26X-3NDJ] (to view all the jurisdictions that have signed the agreement, click 
through the years displayed across the top of the page). 
 95. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2016-137 (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/ 
offshore-voluntary-compliance-efforts-top-10-billion-more-than-100000-taxpayers-come-back-into-
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The FATCA legislation illustrates the power that Congress possesses, 
when it wishes, to enact legislation that can reduce particular forms of tax 
abuse. At the same time, it also demonstrates that the legislative process can 
take years to unfold and that the revenue leakage to the government in the 
interim can be immense.96 
2.  Congress Authorizes the Treasury Department To Promulgate Regulations 
Despite the many virtues of utilizing the legislative approach, Congress 
recognizes that it must also rely upon other means to address tax-abuse 
techniques. Indeed, sprinkled throughout the Code are tacit congressional 
acknowledgments that it lacks the technical expertise to rein in particular tax-
abuse techniques and empowers the Treasury Department to take remedial 
action.97 The delegation of this responsibility to the administrative arm of the 
government makes eminent sense: Treasury Department members are skilled 
tax experts charged with safeguarding the nation’s fiscal well-being.98 
Representative of this approach is Code section 529(f),99 pertaining to 
qualified tuition programs (“QTPs”). It reads as follows: “Notwithstanding 
any other provision of this section, the Secretary shall prescribe such 
regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of 
 
compliance [https://perma.cc/VB2H-34LR] (heralding FATCA’s success and what it has been able to 
accomplish with the title “Offshore Voluntary Compliance Efforts Top $10 Billion; More Than 
100,000 Taxpayers Come Back into Compliance”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-
180, FOREIGN ASSET REPORTING: ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENHANCE COMPLIANCE EFFORTS, 
ELIMINATE OVERLAPPING REQUIREMENTS, AND MITIGATE BURDENS ON U.S. PERSONS 
ABROAD 41–42 (2019) (“Because of FATCA, IRS receives information on foreign financial assets 
from hundreds of thousands of filers annually. IRS could use this information to help ensure 
taxpayers holding offshore assets report and pay taxes owed on income generated from such assets.”). 
 96. Consider the fact that in 2010 Congress finally passed the Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act which instituted the panoply of foreign account reporting requirements. See supra note 76 and 
accompanying text. This is an emblematic example of congressional loitering: for decades, it was 
common knowledge that wealthy taxpayers routinely hid their investments in such accounts to avoid 
their U.S. tax obligations. See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 113TH 
CONG., REP. ON OFFSHORE TAX EVASION: THE EFFORT TO COLLECT UNPAID TAXES ON 
BILLIONS IN HIDDEN OFFSHORE ACCOUNTS 9 (2014) (“Over thirty years ago, in 1983, this 
Subcommittee held hearings on how U.S. taxpayers were using offshore secrecy jurisdictions to hide 
assets and evade U.S. taxes. Since then, the problem has only grown. In 2000, the U.S. State 
Department estimated that assets secreted in offshore jurisdictions totaled $4.8 trillion.”). 
 97. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 482 (delegating responsibility to the Secretary of the Treasury to issue 
regulations to “distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances 
between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, 
apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the 
income of any of such organizations, trades, or businesses”). 
 98. See Role of the Treasury, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/about/general-
information/role-of-the-treasury [https://perma.cc/TW5C-RJ7V] (“Treasury’s mission highlights its 
role as the steward of U.S. economic and financial systems, and as an influential participant in the 
world economy.”). 
 99. I.R.C. § 529(f). 
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this section and to prevent abuse of such purposes, including regulations 
under chapters 11, 12, and 13 of this title.”100 
When Congress first introduced QTPs to the Code,101 it thought that 
taxpayers would use them as intended—strictly as a tool to advance the 
educational interests of their loved ones.102 Congress did not anticipate that a 
stampede of taxpayers would instead choose to use QTPs as a strategic wealth-
transfer device.103 
Once Congress learned how taxpayers were manipulating QTPs to 
achieve unintended objectives, it enacted section 529(f), which granted broad 
leeway to the Treasury Department to promulgate anti-abuse regulations.104 In 
2008, with congressional authorization, the Treasury Department issued an 
elaborately detailed announcement that the agency would promulgate 
comprehensive anti-abuse regulations to curtail taxpayers from utilizing QTPs 
in ways that Congress never intended.105 
Section 529(f) is not an isolated example of congressional deference to 
Treasury Department expertise. The Code is replete with examples of such 
 
 100. Id.  
 101. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1806(a), 110 Stat. 1755, 
1895 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 529). 
 102. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 104TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX 
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 104TH CONGRESS 197 (Comm. Print 1996) (“The Congress 
believed that it is appropriate to clarify the tax treatment of State-sponsored prepaid tuition and 
educational savings programs in order to encourage persons to save to meet post-secondary 
educational expenses.”). 
 103. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-38-06, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 
4, THE “PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006,” AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE ON JULY 28, 2006, AND 
AS CONSIDERED BY THE SENATE ON AUGUST 3, 2006, at 369 (2006).  
For example, assume that in 2007, when the gift tax annual exclusion amount under [Code] 
section 2503(b) is $12,000, Grandparents wish to give more than $1 million to Child, free of 
transfer taxes. Grandparents open [Code] section 529 accounts for each of their 10 
grandchildren, naming Child the [Account Owner] of each account. Grandparents use the 5-
year-spread rule of [Code] section 529(c)(2)(B) to contribute $120,000 ($60,000 from each 
Grandparent) to each grandchild’s account without triggering any gift or generation-
skipping transfer (GST) tax liability. The earnings then accumulate on a tax-deferred basis 
in the accounts and Child may withdraw the balances at any time. If Grandparents survive 
for 5 years, the account balances will not be included in their gross estates at death. In effect, 
Grandparents have transferred $1.2 million to Child while claiming that no transfer taxes are 
due and claiming to use none of their applicable credit amount (formerly the unified credit). 
Guidance on Qualified Tuition Programs Under Section 529, 73 Fed. Reg. 3441, 3442 (proposed Jan. 
18, 2008). 
 104. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1304, 120 Stat. 780, 1109–10 
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 529(f)). 
 105. See generally Guidance on Qualified Tuition Programs Under Section 529, 73 Fed. Reg. at 
3442–43 (detailing proposed anti-abuse regulations in an announcement). For reasons unknown, the 
Treasury Department has not yet acted upon its own initiative and promulgated regulations targeting 
the abuse of QTPs. 
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delegations of authority.106 The message that Congress intends to send via 
these legislative initiatives is clear: taxpayers’ attempts at circumvention will 
be scrutinized for legitimacy. Akin to judicial doctrines, the mere threat of 
such delegations of authority chills taxpayers’ temptations to engage in tax 
abuse. Yes, with the help of their trusted advisers, taxpayers can devise 
intricate tax-avoidance plans, but equipped with appropriate regulatory 
authority, the Treasury Department, at a moment’s notice, can thwart these 
plans. 
3.  The Treasury Department, on Its Own Initiative, Promulgates Regulations 
To Safeguard the Tax Base 
The Treasury Department is comprised of some of the most skilled tax 
experts in the country.107 Deeply ensconced in the accounting community, 
these experts routinely learn through a multitude of media—professional 
continuing education seminars, the popular press, online research, and various 
investigations—how taxpayers skillfully mitigate their tax burdens in ways 
that contravene congressional intent. 108 Under a congressional mandate, 109 
when the Treasury Department uncovers a new tax avoidance technique (a so-
called “reportable transaction”),110 it is supposed to publish notice of these 
“listed transactions,” 111  and, in addition, ensure that certain additional 
 
 106. When Congress authorizes so-called legislative regulations, their governing effect is 
noteworthy. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States, 329 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1964) (“Thus the 
regulations so promulgated became legislative in character having the force and effect of law, so long 
as they were reasonably adapted . . . to the administration and enforcement of the act and did not 
contravene some statutory provision.”); E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 1, 8–9 
(1994) (“[A] legislative regulation, which flows from a specific congressional grant of authority, is 
entitled to greater deference than a regulation promulgated under the general rulemaking power in 
section 7805(a).”), aff’d, 41 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 1994), aff’d sub nom. Conoco, Inc. v. Comm’r, 42 F.3d 
972 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 107. See RICHARD E. ANDERSEN, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 
(2008), 2008 WL 5689071, at *3 (“Throughout the tax area, . . . the Treasury Department is generally 
able to draw upon experienced and thoughtful officials.”). 
 108. See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques & Floyd Norris, Wealthy, Helped by Wall Street, Find New Ways 
To Escape Tax on Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/01/business/ 
wealthy-helped-by-wall-st-new-find-ways-to-escape-tax-on-profits.html [https://perma.cc/G7PJ-
68D7 (dark archive)]. 
Seventy-five years after it was enacted, the Federal tax on profits from the sale of stock, land 
or other assets—known as the capital gains tax—is becoming largely academic to the nation’s 
wealthiest taxpayers. Even as a growing number of Americans with more modest incomes 
are paying capital gains taxes because of their growing mutual-fund profits, wealthy 
taxpayers . . . can take advantage of a growing arsenal of Wall Street techniques to delay or 
entirely avoid taxes on their investment gains. 
Id. 
 109. I.R.C. § 6011(a). 
 110. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b) (as amended in 2010). 
 111. Id. § 1.6011-4(b)(2). 
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reporting requirements are met.112 Once the IRS publishes notice of these so-
called “listed transactions” on its website, 113  anti-abuse regulation 
promulgation is commonplace.114 
One such taxpayer-compliance initiative received nationwide attention: 
in the mid-1990s, the Treasury Department instituted anti-abuse partnership 
tax regulations.115 The promulgation of these regulations did not happen in a 
vacuum; to the contrary, the Treasury Department crafted these regulations in 
response to widespread publicity that hordes of taxpayers were utilizing 
partnerships (as defined under subchapter K of the Code) as tax-minimization 
devices with little or no economic substance, thereby threatening the integrity 
of the income tax base.116 
To protect the nation’s coffers, the Treasury Department responded by 
promulgating regulations which adopted a two-pronged approach. The 
agency’s regulations provide (1) a general anti-abuse set of rules and (2) an 
abuse-of-entity set of rules.117 Together, these two rule sets are designed to foil 
taxpayers’ ability to thwart congressional will.118 Consider how each rule set 
operates. 
 
 112. See generally Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure: Toward Tax Shelter Detection, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1629 (2009) (describing the disclosure process associated with abusive tax 
transactions). 
 113. Recognized Abusive and Listed Transactions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/listed-transactions [https://perma.cc/JNE6-RPW9] (last 
updated Dec. 30, 2020) (listing transactions in chronological order). 
 114. See, e.g., Proposed Amendments to the Regulations, § 1.302-5(b)(4): Redemptions 
Taxable as Dividends, 67 Fed. Reg. 64,331, 64,337 (proposed Oct. 18, 2002) (proposing that after 
a taxpayer’s shares are entirely redeemed, rather than the taxpayer’s basis in those shares passing to 
a related taxpayer (as was the case under the prior regulations), the tax basis is 
instead  held suspended and treated as a putative loss on the so-called inclusion date). The 
promulgation of anti-abuse regulations attests to the narrative that the Treasury Department 
considers its taxpayer-compliance mission of paramount importance. The Agency, Its Mission 
and  Statutory  Authority,  I.R.S.,  https://www.irs.gov/about-irs/the-agency-its-mission-and-statutory-
authority [https://perma.cc/T3G7-YL3R] (last updated Sept. 28, 2020) (“Provide America’s 
taxpayers top quality service by helping them understand and meet their tax responsibilities and 
enforce the law with integrity and fairness to all.”). 
 115. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (as amended in 1995). These new regulations were announced under 
the title “Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule” and went into effect in 1994. Subchapter K Anti-Abuse 
Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 23, 23–24 (Jan. 3, 1995) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1 § 1.701-2). 
 116. See, e.g., Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 14, at 4–5 (“Subchapter K also has several 
special rules not otherwise available in the Internal Revenue Code . . . . It is, therefore, not surprising 
that subchapter K has become the vehicle of choice for a wide variety of tax shelters.”). 
 117. § 1.701-2(a), (e). 
 118. Herman J. Marino, The Final Partnership Anti-Abuse Regulation: The Treasury Redefines the 
“Intent of Subchapter K”, 73 TAXES 171, 172 (1995). The Treasury claimed that its purpose in 
promulgating the anti-abuse regulation was to target the limited number of taxpayers who were 
entering “into partnerships for the sole purpose of reducing their . . . tax liability, especially packaged 
partnership transactions.” Id. 
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The general anti-abuse set of rules is broad in nature. It first sets forth 
the central underlying tenets of subchapter K.119 With this foundation in 
mind, it declares that if taxpayers utilize partnerships “in a manner that is 
inconsistent with the intent of subchapter K, the Commissioner can recast the 
transaction for federal tax purposes, as appropriate to achieve tax results that 
are consistent with the intent of subchapter K.”120 The rule then details the 
exact manner in which the Commissioner may recast questionable partnership 
use, offering eleven examples of potential tax abuse and various remedial 
measures that are at the Commissioner’s disposal to yield correct tax 
outcomes.121 
The second set of anti-abuse rules is different in nature from the first. It 
pertains to situations where taxpayers seek to abuse a partnership’s entity 
nature by using it as a mechanism to achieve tax savings.122 When this occurs, 
the second rule set permits the Commissioner to “treat a partnership as an 
aggregate of its partners in whole or in part as appropriate to carry out the 
purpose of any provision of the Internal Revenue Code or the regulations 
promulgated thereunder.” 123  For example, if a partnership issues a debt 
instrument in order to maneuver around one of the Code’s interest deduction 
limitations, the IRS may ignore the partnership’s separate existence and 
instead treat the individual partners as if they had each issued a pro-rata share 
of the debt.124 
Given the sweeping nature of these anti-abuse Treasury regulations, 
some commentators have questioned their legitimacy,125 while other observers 
 
 119. § 1.701-2(a). 
 120. Id. § 1.701-2(b). 
 121. Id. § 1.701-2(d). 
 122. Id. § 1.701-2(e), (f). 
 123. Id. § 1.701-2(e)(1). 
 124. Id. § 1.701-2(f), Example 1. 
 125. See, e.g., Alan Gunn, The Use and Misuse of the Antiabuse Rules: Lessons from the Partnership 
Antiabuse Regulations, 54 SMU L. REV. 159, 159 (2001) (“The regulations [anti-abuse rules] are badly 
written; so badly written that it is hard to imagine that they can actually be applied to many cases. 
Furthermore, they attempt to make the concept of abuse do too much work.”); Linda D. Jellum, 
Dodging the Taxman: Why the Treasury’s Anti-Abuse Regulation Is Unconstitutional, 70 U. MIA. L. REV. 
152, 155 (2015) (“However, the anti-abuse regulation should not fill [the] gaps [in the economic-
substance statute] because [the anti-abuse regulation] is unconstitutional or, alternatively, ultra 
vires.”); William F. Nelson, The Limits of Literalism: The Effect of Substance over Form, Clear Reflection 
and Business Purpose Considerations on the Proper Interpretation of Subchapter K, 73 TAXES 641, 641 
(1995) (“The Treasury’s promulgation of the Anti-abuse Rule, which was issued in final form on 
December 24, 1994, has provoked unusual, if not unprecedented, opposition from tax 
professionals.”). But see FLA. BAR SECTION OF TAX’N, COMMENTS CONCERNING PROPOSED 
TREAS. REG. SECTION 1.701-2 PERTAINING TO THE RECHARACTERIZATION OF CERTAIN 
PARTNERSHIP TRANSACTIONS (reprinted in Florida Bar Committee Call for Antiabuse Rule’s Overhaul, 
TAX NOTES TODAY, June 22, 1994, 1994 TNT 142-41 (LEXIS)) (“The adoption of proposed 
regulation section 1.701-2 to attack perceived abuses involving a ‘small number of large partnership 
transactions’ is akin to using an atomic bomb to perform delicate brain surgery.”). 
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have steadfastly supported the anti-abuse regulatory initiative and 
commended the Treasury Department for its efforts.126 Tested over the last 
quarter of a century, the anti-abuse regulations have withstood judicial 
scrutiny and have been upheld as a legitimate exercise of administrative 
authority, well within the Treasury Department’s jurisdiction.127 Admittedly, 
it is hard to gauge exactly how successful these regulations have been in 
achieving their stated objective of curbing partnership tax abuse. 128 
Nevertheless, the regulations have added a valuable defensive instrument to 
the Treasury Department’s toolbox to protect the fisc by defeating tax-
minimization schemes. 
B. Shortcomings of Efforts To Curb Tax Abuse 
To some extent, the combined efforts of Congress and the Treasury 
Department to address tax abuse have proven efficacious. Evidence of this is 
found in revenue numbers and voluntary compliance rate percentages. In 
2017, the United States collected approximately $3.3 trillion in taxes,129 the 
vast bulk of which was paid voluntarily rather than as the result of IRS 
audits.130 In terms of overall compliance, the voluntary compliance rate for 
taxpayers fulfilling their tax obligations remains fairly steady, hovering in the 
lower-to-middle eighty-percent range. 131  Revenue collections and the 
voluntary compliance rate indicate that while tax abuse may be a fairly 
common feature of the tax landscape, it does not dominate it. 
Despite the nation’s revenue collections and voluntary compliance rate, 
there is clearly room for improvement. The so-called gross tax gap—or the 
 
 126. See, e.g., Gunn, supra note 125, at 173–76 (extolling the virtues of the anti-abuse 
regulations); Andrea Monroe, What’s in a Name: Can the Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule Really Stop 
Partnership Tax Abuse?, 60 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 401, 406 (2010) (suggesting that “Treasury 
regulation section 1.701-2, commonly referred to as the partnership anti-abuse rule (‘PAAR’), may 
provide subchapter K with the support it so desperately requires”). 
 127. See, e.g., Kearney Partners Fund, LLC v. United States, No. 10-cv-153-FtM-SPC, 2013 WL 
1774871, at *8–9 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2013), aff’d per curiam, 803 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(referencing the anti-abuse partnership regulations, the court indicated that the IRS may disregard 
the entire transaction). 
 128. See 2 ARTHUR B. WILLIS, JOHN S. PENNELL & PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP 
TAXATION ¶ 1.03[6], at 1-59 (student ed. 1999–2000) (“It appears doubtful that the overall landscape 
of Subchapter K has changed meaningfully by reason of th[e] [anti-abuse partnership] 
[r]egulation[s].”). 
 129. STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-3-18, OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX 
SYSTEM AS IN EFFECT FOR 2018, at 25 tbl.A-1 (Comm. Print 2018). 
 130. See I.R.S., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 2018, at 21, 27 tbl.9b (2019) 
(indicating that the IRS audit rate on individual returns for fiscal year 2018 hovered around 0.6%). 
 131. I.R.S., No. 1415, FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR 
TAX YEARS 2011–2013, at 1 (2019) [hereinafter I.R.S., TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR 2011–2013], 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1415.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JW5-8977] (“The estimated [voluntary 
compliance rate] is 83.6 percent.”). 
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difference between what taxpayers pay in taxes in a timely manner and what 
they should pay if they fully complied with the tax laws132—hovers in the $400 
billion range.133 This dollar figure does not include tax-abuse techniques, such 
as upstream tax planning, that contravene congressional intent but fall under 
the umbrella of tax avoidance rather than tax evasion.134 Furthermore, close to 
one out of every five tax dollars goes unpaid,135 signifying that something is 
awry with how Congress approaches tax abuse, particularly those that 
taxpayers flaunt. 
Distilled down to its essentials, the present approach suffers from two 
major deficits: Congress is inept at efficiently handling tax abuse, and the 
Treasury Department lacks a clear mandate to eradicate them. Consider each. 
The framers clearly crafted the Constitution so that Congress could not 
pass legislation willy-nilly and in haste. To the contrary, the framers created 
two deliberative bodies, the House and the Senate, which together would 
enact legislation only after careful consideration and debate.136 And for most 
major legislation involving large sectors of the economy (for example, health 
care) or social issues (for example, voting rights), this approach makes sense: 
the nation needs to pause and discuss the merits and shortcomings of such 
legislative overhauls. However, although overall tax policy merits careful 
consideration and debate, the same philosophy does not necessarily extend to 
tax-abuse techniques that suddenly crop up in the public domain. When a 
particular form of tax abuse becomes known, it is important that the IRS 
immediately eradicates it. This currently does not happen; rather, in the years 
or decades that it takes Congress to respond, billions of dollars of valuable tax 
 
 132. Id. (“The gross tax gap is the amount of true tax liability that is not paid voluntarily and 
timely.”). 
 133. Id. 
The estimated gross tax gap is $441 billion. The net tax gap is the gross tax gap less tax that 
subsequently will be paid, either paid voluntarily or collected through IRS administrative 
and enforcement activities; it is the portion of the gross tax gap that will not be paid. It is 
estimated that $60 billion of the gross tax gap eventually will be paid resulting in a net tax 
gap of $381 billion. 
Id. 
 134. See Dave Rifkin, A Primer on the “Tax Gap” and Methodologies for Reducing It, 27 QUINNIPIAC 
L. REV. 375, 377–79 (2009) (“The ‘tax gap’ represents the annual amount of ‘noncompliance’ with the 
Code.”). 
 135. See I.R.S., TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR 2011–2013, supra note 131, at 1 (“The estimated 
[voluntary compliance rate] is 83.6 percent.”). 
 136. See, e.g., Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 673 F.2d 425, 
464 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“What emerges from our analysis of the purposes of the lawmaking restrictions 
in Article I is that the Framers were determined that the legislative power should be difficult to 
employ. The requirements of presentation to the President and bicameral concurrence ultimately 
serve the same fundamental purpose: to restrict the operation of the legislative power to those 
policies which meet the approval of three constituencies, or a supermajority of two.”). 
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revenue may be lost. 137  Furthermore, tax advisers who make handsome 
professional fees plotting these devices have significant financial incentives to 
continue to devote their time and effort to engineering new tax-abuse 
techniques. They know that even if Congress ultimately eliminates particular 
tax-saving devices, they will, in the meantime, reap fees handsome and 
bountiful enough to make such endeavors well worthwhile.138 
The Treasury Department’s actions are sometimes met with stiff 
resistance. This is particularly true when it seeks to implement anti-abuse 
regulations where Congress has not explicitly delegated this responsibility. 
When the Treasury Department first issued its partnership–anti-abuse 
regulations, for example, there was a firestorm of opposition.139 A more recent 
example involves the utilization of valuation discounts involving transfers 
between family members whereby the fair market values of assets are 
strategically diminished—at least on a temporary basis—to reduce transfer tax 
exposure. 140 In 2016, the Treasury Department proposed regulations that 
would have curtailed this practice.141 The release of these proposed regulations 
caused a tumult in the estate-planning community, 142  which vigorously 
attacked the Treasury Department’s actions as being beyond the scope of its 
 
 137. The sentiment has been well summed up by Professor Joseph Bankman: “One 
obvious disadvantage to the legislative approach is that it gives taxpayers a multi-year window 
in which to ‘cash in’ on even the most egregious tax-driven transactions, so long as those 
transactions are supported by the literal language o[f] one or more statutes.” Joseph 
Bankman,  Stanford  Professor  Rebuts  Criticisms of Partnership Antiabuse Reg., TAXNOTES (July 1, 1994), 
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-federal/partnerships/stanford-professor-rebuts-criticisms-
partnership-antiabuse-reg/1994/07/20/13h88 [https://perma.cc/L9T3-LVS9 (staff-uploaded dark 
archive)]. 
 138. See, e.g., Pierre Paulden & Ben Steverman, What Leon Black Got for Paying Jeffrey Epstein $158 
Million (2), BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 26 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-
26/what-leon-black-got-for-paying-jeffrey-epstein-158-million?sref=dcitGkK3 [https://perma.cc/ 
X8LZ-A8CD (staff-uploaded dark archive)] (explaining the exorbitant fee paid to a consultant to 
remedy a deficit grantor retained annuity trust). 
 139. See, e.g., Richard M. Lipton, Controversial Partnership Anti-Abuse Prop. Regs. Raise Many 
Questions, 81 J. TAX’N 68, 74 (1994), 1994 WL 555084 (“Although most tax practitioners are opposed 
to abuse and support the IRS in its efforts to attack the improper use of partnerships, many have 
questioned whether the Proposed Regulations are the appropriate means to reach that end.”); 
Partnership Antiabuse Regs Are ‘Fatally Flawed,’ Banoff Contends, 63 TAX NOTES 1692, 1692 (1994) 
(arguing that the proposed Treasury anti-abuse regulations are misguided). 
 140. See generally Repetti, supra note 46 (explaining how taxpayers strategical make gifts to their 
loved ones that purposefully diminish asset values until, at a later point in time, they can coordinate 
their efforts to subsequently maximize asset values). 
 141. See Estate, Gift, and Generation-Skipping Transfer Taxes; Restrictions on Liquidation of an 
Interest, 81 Fed. Reg. 51413, 51413–25 (proposed Aug. 4, 2016). 
 142. See Robert Grossman, Update on the Proposed Section 2704 Regulations, PRAC. TAX 
STRATEGIES, Feb. 2017, at 36, 36 (“The public reaction to these proposed regulations has been 
incredible. After the proposed regulations were published in the Federal Register on 8/4/16, those 
wishing to submit comments to the Treasury had a 60-day window to do so (until 11/2/16). In that 
short time frame, the Treasury Department received nearly 9,800 submissions.”). 
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authority.143 As a result of this lobbying campaign, the Treasury Department 
ultimately withdrew these proposed regulations. 144 When it comes to tax 
abuse, the absence of explicit congressional delegation of authority often gives 
secure refuge to tax planners: they can question the legitimacy of the Treasury 
Department’s actions and, in doing so, may quash the Treasury’s attempts to 
rein in a particular form of tax abuse. 
Thus, the nation appears stymied. On the one hand, due to structural 
limitations, Congress is ill-equipped to address tax abuse. On the other hand, 
while the Treasury Department has fared somewhat better in its endeavors to 
curb tax abuse, its record is replete with failures to intercede. In a nutshell, 
Congress is constantly playing after-the-fact catch-up to taxpayers’ tax 
shenanigans, and the Treasury Department’s preventative actions and their 
legitimacy are routinely challenged and attacked. Corrosive tax abuse thus 
remains an enduring fixture of the tax landscape. Left unchecked, the status 
quo is problematic: many taxpayers dedicate significant resources to defeating 
their tax obligations, and as a consequence of taxpayers’ actions, the 
government is left underfunded. In short, something must be done. 
III.  REFORMING THE STATUS QUO 
In many legislative spheres, to implement its policies, Congress routinely 
delegates power to administrative agencies such as the Food and Drug 
Administration and the Security and Exchange Commission.145 For example, 
when it comes to the goal of securing clean air in the Clean Air Act,146 
 
 143. See Robert J. Grossman, Proposed Section 2704 Regulations Work To Minimize Valuation 
Discounts, PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES, Dec. 2016, at 259, 259 (“The new rules represent a camouflaged 
means of imposing a significant tax increase without direct congressional authorization.”); Opinion, A 
Stealth Death Tax Increase, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2016, at A14 (“Since Congress does not agree that 
the Internal Revenue Service should suck more cash out of family farms, Treasury Secretary Jack 
Lew is up to his usual tricks, trashing established interpretations of tax law to bypass the legislative 
branch.”). 
 144. See STEVEN T. MNUCHIN, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, SECOND REPORT TO 
THE  PRESIDENT ON IDENTIFYING AND REDUCING TAX REGULATORY BURDENS EXECUTIVE 
ORDER  13789, at 3 (2017), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/2018-
03004_Tax_EO_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/76YN-UT4M] (“After reviewing these comments, 
Treasury and the IRS now believe that the proposed regulations’ approach to the problem of artificial 
valuation discounts is unworkable . . . . In light of these concerns, Treasury and the IRS currently 
believe that these proposed regulations should be withdrawn in their entirety. Treasury and the IRS 
plan to publish a withdrawal of the proposed regulations shortly in the Federal Register.”). 
 145. David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 266 
(2013) (noting that “the delegation of broad lawmaking power to administrative agencies” is a 
“foundational government practice”); F. Andrew Hessick & Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Non-
Redelegation Doctrine, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 170 (2013) (“Congress frequently delegates its 
power and regularly confers on administrative agencies the power to develop policy through 
rulemaking.”); Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 329 (1987) 
(explaining that federal administrative agencies wield tremendous decisional powers). 
 146. Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q). 
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Congress did not detail the criteria of the term pollution.147 Instead, through a 
broad delegation of regulatory power, it directed the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) to take the necessary steps—including detailing 
the criteria of pollution—to accomplish this goal.148 This example is not unique; 
the United States Code is replete with numerous other examples of Congress 
delegating its legislative powers to appropriate administrative agencies rather 
than undertaking the nettlesome and time-consuming task of enacting more 
elaborate and detailed statutory provisions.149 
Yet, when it comes to the delegation of authority in the tax realm, 
Congress has been far more circumspect. On the one hand, cognizant that its 
command of tax knowledge is lackluster, Congress has issued a blanket 
invitation to the Treasury Department to promulgate interpretative 
regulations150 to provide illuminating guidance to taxpayers.151 On the other 
hand, Congress periodically issues legislative mandates that essentially 
instruct the Treasury Department to act as a deputy legislature by crafting 
binding rules upon taxpayers;152 such delegations result in what are commonly 
known as legislative regulations.153 
 
 147. See Charles de Saillan, The Use of Imminent Hazard Provisions of Environmental Laws To 
Compel Cleanup at Federal Facilities, 27 STAN. ENV’T. L.J. 43, 132 (2008) (“The Clean Air Act does 
not define the term ‘pollution’ . . . .”). 
 148. See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (authorizing the EPA administrator to set emissions standards 
for “any air pollutant . . . which in his judgment cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution which may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare”). 
 149. See, e.g., James R. Hines Jr. & Kyle D. Logue, Delegating Tax, 114 MICH. L. REV. 235, 236–
37 (2015) (“Congress regularly delegates enormous amounts of lawmaking power, from control over 
the money supply (power delegated to the Federal Reserve Board) to the process for closing military 
bases after the end of the Cold War (which Congress entrusted to the Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission).” (footnotes omitted)). 
 150. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to “prescribe all needful rules and 
regulations for the enforcement of [the Code], including all rules and regulations as may be necessary 
by reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue”). 
 151. See Kuhn v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 1229, 1233 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (“On any journey 
through the labyrinth of the Tax Code, each judicial step must be carefully taken.”); see also Learned 
Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947) (describing the Income Tax Code as words 
that “merely dance before . . . in a meaningless procession: cross-reference to cross-reference, 
exception upon exception”). 
 152. See BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, 3 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, 
ESTATES, AND GIFTS ¶ 110.5.3 (2019) (“Legislative regulations were often said to have the force of 
law because they entail an exercise of power delegated by Congress to the agency, as though it were a 
deputy legislature.”). 
 153. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States, 329 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1964) (“Thus the 
regulations so promulgated became legislative in character having the force and effect of law, so long 
as they were reasonably adapted . . . to the administration and enforcement of the act and did not 
contravene some statutory provision.”); E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 1, 8–9 
(1994) (“[A] legislative regulation, which flows from a specific congressional grant of authority, is 
entitled to greater deference than a regulation promulgated under the general rulemaking power in 
section 7805(a).”), aff’d, 41 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 1994), aff’d sub nom. Conoco, Inc. v. Comm’r, 42 F.3d 
972 (5th Cir. 1995). 
99 N.C. L. REV. 643 (2021) 
672 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99 
When combating tax abuse, the Treasury Department has historically 
relied exclusively upon its interpretative powers to target and eliminate 
questionable taxpayer practices.154 In some instances, its efforts have been 
upheld. 155  In other instances, notwithstanding the deference ordinarily 
afforded Treasury regulations,156 its efforts have fallen short of the mark.157 
And in still other instances, the agency has decided not to take action for fear 
that its action would be struck down as impermissible and beyond the scope of 
the enabling legislation.158 
Yet, in an era in which the federal government spends approximately 
four dollars for every three dollars it collects,159 Congress must consider taking 
novel measures to ensure that every tax dollar that it anticipates receiving is 
actually collected. This is why Congress should issue a legislative mandate in 
the form of a new Code section that encapsulates a general anti-abuse rule and 
reads something along the following lines: 
In order to curb taxpayers from engaging in transactions and other 
endeavors that are abusive in nature (i.e., specifically designed to 
minimize a taxpayer’s tax burden in a manner that is inconsistent with 
or contrary to congressional intent), the Treasury Department shall 
craft regulations that delineate the scope and boundaries of those 
transactions and endeavors that are permissible and those that are not. 
In no event shall the absence of the Treasury Department 
promulgating regulations be construed to mean that the agency 
sanctions a particular tax practice. 
 
 154. For example, when taxpayers, in order to reduce their tax burden, sought to assign the tax 
basis they had in their redeemed shares to related parties, see I.R.S. Notice 2001-45, 2001-33 I.R.B. 
129, the Treasury Department stepped in and revamped the governing regulations to eliminate this 
practice. See Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(c) (as amended in 2007). 
 155. See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53 (2011) 
(noting that a Treasury regulation will generally be upheld as valid “unless it is ‘arbitrary or 
capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute’” (quoting Household Credit Servs., Inc. 
v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 242 (2004)). 
 156. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 157. See, e.g., United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 487, 490 (2012) 
(declining to apply the extended limitations period of Treasury Regulation section 6501(e)(1)(A) to 
the case at bar on the basis that when “a statute is unambiguous . . . there is ‘no gap for the agency to 
fill’ and thus ‘no room for agency discretion’” (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n. v. Brand X 
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 (2005))). 
 158. See, e.g., I.R.S. Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 C.B. 621 (announcing that the IRS will not 
promulgate regulations on the taxability of frequent flyer miles and other promotional benefits until 
Congress issues additional guidance). 
 159. See Kimberly Amadeo, US Federal Budget Breakdown: The Budget Components and Impact on 
the US Economy, BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-federal-budget-breakdown-3305789 
[https://perma.cc/EPA9-5DQ5] (Oct. 29, 2020) (“President Donald Trump released a would-be 
record $4.829 trillion federal budget proposal for fiscal year (FY) 2021 on Feb. 5, 2020. The U.S. 
government estimates it will receive $3.863 trillion in revenue, creating a $966 billion deficit for Oct. 
1, 2020, through Sept 30. 2021.” (footnote omitted)). 
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Empowering the Treasury Department with such broad authority would be 
consequential: the Treasury Department’s power would be augmented; 
taxpayers and their advisers would be far more circumspect in how they craft 
their tax-minimization techniques; in particular instances of tax abuse, the 
judiciary might grant greater deference to Treasury Department regulations; 
and, finally, the government coffers could anticipate greater revenue yields 
from existing statutory tax laws. 
Below, Section III.A explores the legitimacy of granting such broad 
authority to the Treasury Department to curb tax abuse; Section III.B details 
the advantages that an administrative approach offers; Section III.C explains 
the disadvantages associated with that administrative approach; and Section 
III.D, utilizing upstream tax planning as a case study, explores the application 
of the administrative approach. 
A. Granting Broad Authority to the Treasury Department To Curb Tax Abuse 
There is little doubt that Congress has the constitutional authority to 
delegate to the Treasury Department the power to promulgate anti-abuse 
regulations.160 Throughout its history, with only two exceptions,161 the U.S. 
Supreme Court has routinely endorsed Congress’s ability to delegate its 
rulemaking power to administrative agencies, 162 and this power has gone 
virtually unchallenged ever since.163 Indeed, a large segment of the nation’s 
 
 160. As a general proposition, Congress can delegate its authority “so long as the statutory 
delegation includes an ‘intelligible principle’ by which a court can evaluate the agency’s exercise of its 
discretion.” Hines & Logue, supra note 149, at 240; see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 
U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (“In a delegation challenge, the constitutional question is whether the statute 
has delegated legislative power to the agency. Article I, § 1, of the Constitution . . . permits no 
delegation of those powers . . . and so we repeatedly have said that when Congress confers 
decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress must ‘lay down by legislative act an intelligible 
principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.’” (alteration in 
original) (citations omitted) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 
(1928))). This same authority to delegate extends to tax. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch., 
562 U.S. at 55 (“[W]e are not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax 
law only. To the contrary, we have expressly ‘[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining a uniform 
approach to judicial review of administrative action.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Dickinson v. 
Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999))). 
 161. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (holding that 
the relevant section of the contested legislation was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
power); Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432–33 (1935) (same). 
 162. See Nicholas Bagley, Opinion, Most of Government Is Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/opinion/sunday/gundy-united-states.html?searchResult 
Position=1 [https://perma.cc/CD3C-FX3D (dark archive)] (“Since 1935, the Supreme Court has 
approved laws telling agencies to regulate ‘in the public interest’ and to set pollution standards 
‘requisite to protect the public health.’ Not once in the 84 years since has the Supreme Court 
invalidated a law because it offends the so-called nondelegation doctrine.”). 
 163. But see Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2148 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(hinting that Congress might lack the power to delegate broad powers to administrative agencies). 
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bureaucratic state is founded specifically upon the legitimacy of Congress’s 
ability to rely upon administrative agencies for support.164 
Notwithstanding the rise of the bureaucratic state, a question has arisen 
that remains unanswered: In the realm of fiscal matters, why has Congress 
exercised its delegation power rather gingerly?165 One reason may be historical 
in nature. A major catalyst in our nation’s formation was the deep antipathy 
expressed by the American colonies toward the British monarchy for foisting a 
tax regime upon them.166 Ever since, Congress has prized the opportunity to 
craft modes of revenue raising—whether it be a system of excise taxes and 
tariffs or an income tax—in which all taxpayers are deemed fairly 
represented.167 Another likely reason Congress has been hesitant to delegate 
broad authority to the Treasury Department is that its members relish the 
political power associated with controlling the nation’s purse strings and, in 
particular, who pays what into the system.168 Representative of this power has 
been the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees, both of 
which are considered by many in the legislative branch and the public as the 
most important and powerful committees in each respective house. 169 
Delegating authority to the Treasury Department to eradicate tax abuse might 
be tantamount to a relinquishment of power—something that no politician 
would savor. 
By way of contrast, however, Congress has tacitly approved of the 
judiciary taking broad measures to curb tax abuse. Consider the fact that over 
the last century the judiciary has developed out of whole cloth a series of 
 
 164. Hines & Logue, supra note 149, at 236 (“The broad delegation of lawmaking power to 
administrative agencies is a well-accepted feature of modern U.S. policymaking.”). 
 165. Id. at 237 (“Congress rarely enacts tax statutes that set out broad tax policy principles and 
authorize the Treasury Department or some other regulatory agency to fill in the details.”). 
 166. See Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American 
Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 869 (1978) (“The revolutionary struggle broke out in 
1764, when the British government began to implement its new policy of taxing the American 
colonies to reduce the debts from the Seven Years’ War. The first step was the Sugar Act, which 
raised the duty payable by Americans on imported molasses. At the same time, the administration 
announced its intention to introduce a stamp tax on the colonies the following year.”). 
 167. See W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 310 (3d ed. 
2016) (“A number of historians have addressed the origins of the federal tax system during the era of 
the American Revolution and the early republic. All emphasize the role of democratic forces, 
concepts of equity, and historical contingency in the development of the federal government’s tax 
regimes from 1775 through the early 1790s.”). 
 168. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New Logic 
of Collective Action, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1174 (2006) (explaining the role money plays in shaping 
legislation and how taxing power gives Congress leverage to elicit campaign donations). 
 169. See, e.g., Eric T. Laity, The Corporation as Administrative Agency: Tax Expenditures and 
Institutional Design, 28 VA. TAX REV. 411, 442 (2008) (“In addition, the congressional committees 
that control tax expenditures — the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means 
Committee — are powerful committees: more powerful than, for example, the education and labor 
committees, which deal with direct expenditure welfare programs.”). 
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doctrines—for example, the substance-over-form doctrine, 170  the step-
transaction doctrine, 171  and the sham-transaction doctrine 172 —which are 
dedicated to eradicating tax-abuse techniques. 173 Rather than question the 
judiciary’s ability to take such measures, Congress recognizes the judiciary’s 
need to act proactively. Recent evidence of congressional approval of the 
judiciary’s role is found in Code section 7701(o), 174  which codified the 
economic-substance doctrine175 and explicitly invited the judiciary to continue 
to employ this doctrine and to attack tax abuse in ways that the Code failed to 
address.176 
Modern political states recognize that administrative agencies can play a 
vital role in curbing tax abuse. As a case study, consider what has transpired in 
Ireland. Several decades ago, the Irish legislature passed a law177—along the 
same lines that this analysis is advocating—that authorized the Irish Tax and 
Customs Agency (the Irish equivalent to the IRS) to institute whatever 
 
 170. As articulated by one judge, this is the principle of “looking through form to [the] 
substance” of a transaction. Estate of Weinert v. Comm’r, 294 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1961). 
 171. The U.S. Supreme Court has defined the step-transaction doctrine as follows: 
[I]nterrelated yet formally distinct steps in an integrated transaction may not be considered 
independently of the overall transaction. By thus “linking together all interdependent steps 
with legal or business significance, rather than taking them in isolation,” federal tax liability 
may be based “on a realistic view of the entire transaction.” 
Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 738 (1989) (quoting 1 BORIS I BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF 
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 4.3.5, p. 4-52 (1981)). 
 172. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[The sham 
transaction doctrine] provides that a transaction is not entitled to tax respect if it lacks economic 
effects or substance other than the generation of tax benefits, or if the transaction serves no business 
purpose.”). 
 173. See Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 
863–64 (1982) (reviewing BORIS I. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND 
GIFTS (1981)) (“It is from these cases that the basic weapons in the Commissioner’s arsenal are 
derived—the business purpose doctrine, the step transaction doctrine, ‘substance over form,’ and 
others. The effect of these doctrines is the existence alongside the Internal Revenue Code of an 
additional (and somewhat autonomous) set of principles for deciding tax disputes.”); see also Boris I. 
Bittker, Pervasive Judicial Doctrines in the Construction of the Internal Revenue Code, 21 HOW. L.J. 693, 
695 (1978) (describing how judicial doctrines are influential in curbing tax evasion). 
 174. See, e.g., Rebecca Rosenberg, Codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine: Agency Response 
and Certain Other Unforeseen Consequences, 10 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 199, 260 (2018) (“The 
statute’s enactment quite clearly signals Congressional approval of the economic substance doctrine 
(even though the doctrine was developed by the courts and did not originate with Congress).”). 
 175. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(A) (“The term ‘economic substance doctrine’ means the common law 
doctrine under which tax benefits under subtitle A with respect to a transaction are not allowable if 
the transaction does not have economic substance or lacks a business purpose.”). 
 176. See id. § 7701(o)(5)(C) (“The determination of whether the economic substance doctrine is 
relevant to a transaction shall be made in the same manner as if this subsection had never been 
enacted.”). 
 177. See Taxes Consolidation Act, 1997 (Act No. 39/1997) (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/ 
eli/1997/act/39/enacted/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/M4HR-K8HJ]. 
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administrative regulations were necessary to curb particular forms of tax 
abuse.178 Since then, politicians and commentators have credited the law for 
invigorating the ability of the Ireland Treasury Department to identify and 
eradicate tax abuse.179 There is no reason why Congress cannot adopt the Irish 
approach or emulate the actions of other countries (e.g., the United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, China, Singapore, 
Italy, South Africa, Kenya, and Australia) that have also enacted general anti-
abuse rules and replicate their successes.180 
B. Administrative Approach’s Advantages 
In contrast to Congress addressing each tax-abuse technique one by one 
and constantly playing a game of catch-up, vesting broad administrative 
authority in the Treasury Department offers the following five major 
advantages. 
One of the primary advantages of vesting the Treasury Department with 
broad administrative authority is that the Code could strike an appropriate 
 
 178. See id.; REVENUE COMM’RS, IRISH TAX & CUSTOMS AGENCY, GUIDANCE NOTES ON 
GAAR: THE GENERAL ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULE & PROTECTIVE NOTIFICATIONS 1–2 (2019), 
https://www.revenue.ie/en/self-assessment-and-self-employment/documents/gaar-guidance-notes.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KV4B-RRC7] (discussing the effects of section 811 of the Irish Tax Code on tax-
avoidance transactions). 
 179. See, e.g., Niamh Keogh, Maura Dineen & John Gulliver, The Tax Disputes and Litigation 
Review: Ireland, L. REVS. (Feb. 26 2020), https://thelawreviews.co.uk/title/the-tax-disputes-and-
litigation-review/ireland#footnote-004-backlink [https://perma.cc/HB8S-MNQC (staff-uploaded 
archive)]. See generally TOM MAGUIRE, IRELAND’S GENERAL ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULE AND THE 
RULE OF IRISH LAW (2014), https://www.taxfind.ie/document/IGAA_XML_10032014-top_doc-
2909710144 [https://perma.cc/483G-MXWU (dark archive)] (explaining in detail the parameters of 
the anti-avoidance rule and its implications). 
 180. See generally Christophe Waerzeggers & Cory Hillier, Introducing a General Anti-Avoidance 
Rule (GAAR), TAX L. IMF TECH. NOTE, Jan. 2016, at 1, 1. The fact that general anti-abuse rules or 
GAARs have a long and rich history, and have become increasingly popular, reflects their apparent 
success. Daniel T. Ostas & Axel Hilling, Global Tax Shelters, the Ethics of Interpretation, and the Need 
for a Pragmatic Jurisprudence, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 745, 767–68 (2016). 
Although new to the United States, GAARs have a long tradition in both common law and 
civil law nations around the world. The first GAAR, enacted in 1878, traces to the common 
law nation of New Zealand. Canada and Australia, also common law countries, have 
longstanding GAARs as well. Sweden, a civil law country . . . , has had a GAAR every year 
but two since 1980. Similarly, the civil law nations of Belgium, Brazil, Finland, Portugal, and 
Spain have had GAARs for decades. In each case, the GAAR, or a related specific 
antiavoidance rule (SAAR), is broadly stated. In fact, ambiguity seems to be the purpose of 
this kind of regulation. By enacting the GAAR or SAAR, the legislature recognizes the need 
to protect the tax base, and it empowers the taxing authority and the tax courts with a 
broadly worded standard designed to protect the legislative intent of other tax provisions.  
Id. 
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balance between being both standards- and rule-based.181 On the one hand, 
when it comes to widespread tax-compliance issues (e.g., payroll tax on labor 
income), the Code should present strict, unambiguous rules that facilitate 
compliance on a large-scale basis.182 On the other hand, the Code must also 
address the tax implications associated with fact patterns and scenarios that 
arise with far less frequency; in such situations, elaborate rules from Congress 
could make the Code even more of a labyrinth than it is today.183 Instead, if 
Congress broadly delegated, leaving detail duty to the Treasury Department, 
the Code would be more concise and easier to administer.184 Akin to the 
requirement that taxpayers report so-called listed transactions (disclosing 
those taxpayer activities that the Treasury Department considers suspect),185 
centralizing the tax-abuse regulations would facilitate the Treasury 
Department’s ability to categorize taxpayer actions, distinguishing between 
those that are permissible and those that are not. 
Second, cracking open the administrative door would empower the 
Treasury Department to act far more expeditiously to quell perceived tax 
abuse than it currently can. As soon as the Treasury Department learned of an 
exploitative taxpayer practice, it could immediately issue a proposed 
regulation to curtail the activity.186 Not only would such expediency arrest the 
hemorrhaging of tax revenue, but it would also have an immense chilling 
effect upon taxpayers and their advisers. The latter would hesitate to spend 
inordinate amounts of time and resources on developing tax-abuse strategies, 
knowing that, at a moment’s notice, the Treasury Department could obliterate 
their tactics. 
 
 181. See David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 860 (1999) 
(asserting that to eliminate excess complexity engendered by a pure rule-based approach, “lawmakers 
and regulators have shifted the tax system toward standards, primarily by adopting what are known as 
‘anti-abuse rules’”). 
 182. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 573 
(1992) (“[A] law may apply to an activity that is undertaken by many individuals: some federal 
income tax provisions apply to millions of individuals and billions of transactions. In such instances, 
rules tend to be preferable.”). 
 183. See Rachelle Holmes Perkins, Breaking the Spell of Tax Budget Magic, 6 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 
21 (2014) (“It is well established that the Internal Revenue Code is a complex labyrinth of rules that 
leaves even the most seasoned tax professionals at times scratching their heads.”). 
 184. See Kaplow, supra note 182, at 621–22 (“If behavior subject to the law is infrequent, 
however, standards are likely to be preferable. Of particular relevance are laws for which behavior 
varies greatly, so that most relevant scenarios are unlikely ever to occur. Determining the appropriate 
content of the law for all such contingencies would be expensive, and most of the expense would be 
wasted. It would be preferable to wait until particular circumstances arise.”). 
 185. I.R.C. §§ 6111(b)(2), 6707A(c)(1). 
 186. See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 14, at 6 (explaining that utilizing anti-abuse rules 
“allows the Service to use broad standards to administer the tax law in place of a collection of narrow 
rules that must be constantly changed in a hopeless attempt to keep pace with the latest tax 
gimmick”); Hines & Logue, supra note 149, at 243 (“Even when the legislative process is working 
well, it may take longer for Congress to pass a law than it takes an agency to make a rule.”). 
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Third, the administrative approach would help contain the spread of tax-
abuse techniques. Fearing that the publication of their tax stratagems would 
attract Treasury Department scrutiny, taxpayers and their advisers would be 
more inclined to keep secret their putative tax-abuse techniques.187 As such, 
other taxpayers could not as readily replicate these tax-avoidance devices. 
Fourth, advance knowledge that the legislative record may play a greater 
role in defining permissible and impermissible behavior would incentivize 
congressional members to be more meticulous about what they enter into the 
congressional record.188 Hopefully, such attention to detail would facilitate 
statutory interpretations and aid the Treasury Department in deciding which 
taxpayer actions are abusive and require regulatory attention. 
Finally, granting the Treasury Department greater administrative leeway 
would increase the importance of the regulatory process. Under current law, 
the Treasury Department must submit its regulations in proposed form for 
public review and comment. 189  During the review phase, taxpayers, tax 
practitioners, bar associations, and CPA organizations are renowned for 
offering detailed and elaborate critiques.190 The Treasury Department has 
often responded favorably to such assistance and revised and recrafted 
proposed regulations in a manner consistent with those suggestions that the 
agency deems meritorious. 191  Were Congress to expand the regulatory 
purview of the Treasury Department, the same coterie of participants would 
be apt to play an even more active and vibrant role in the regulation-
 
 187. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, A Tax Break for the Rich Who Can Keep a Secret, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 10, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/10/business/a-tax-break-for-the-rich-who-can-
keep-a-secret.html [https://perma.cc/6LP9-6NE7 (dark archive)] (“To get in on these tax avoidance 
deals, investors must sign statements promising never to disclose the terms to anyone except their 
financial advisers.”). Admittedly, enhanced public disclosure via the proposed Treasury regulations 
could drive some tax stratagems into greater secrecy, making them even more difficult for the IRS to 
uncover. 
 188. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 845, 847 (1992) (“First, I demonstrate that we need to use legislative history of providing 
examples of its usefulness. Second, I address the major arguments against its use in order to show 
that these arguments call, not for abandonment of the practice, but at most for its careful use. Finally, 
I offer some institutional reasons for why any significant change in the extent to which courts look to 
legislative history would likely prove harmful.”). 
 189. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
 190. See, e.g., Shu-Yi Oei & Leigh Osofsky, Legislation and Comment: The Making of the § 199A 
Regulations, 69 EMORY L.J. 209, 224–25 (2019) (“First, major industries and their representatives and 
trade associations asked Treasury for favorable treatment. Second, professional organizations of 
sophisticated tax experts (such as the New York State Bar Association (NYSBA) Tax Section and the 
American Bar Association (ABA) Tax Section) advised Treasury on how various technical issues 
should be resolved.”). 
 191. See id. at 226 (“In the final regulations, Treasury carefully catalogued and responded to the 
comments that it had received in the official notice-and-comment period. In many cases, Treasury 
clarified issues raised by commenters through text or examples and made technical changes to the 
proposed regulations in response to feedback about potential problems.” (citations omitted)). 
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formulation process regarding the labeling of particular transactions as tax 
abuse. 
C. Administrative Approach’s Disadvantages 
The virtues of using a broader administrative approach to combat tax 
abuse are compelling. However, there are several risks and concerns associated 
with an administrative approach that should not be discounted or dismissed 
out of hand. These are threefold in nature. 
The first is that the Treasury Department might overstep its bounds and 
act too heavy-handedly to curb tax abuse. More specifically, the agency might 
draft regulations that are overly expansive, attempting to curtail what some 
commentators consider legitimate taxpayer behavior. For example, the 
Treasury Department could conceivably promulgate regulations that declare 
as abusive so-called Crummey withdrawal powers,192 which are designed to 
transform otherwise future interests (which are ineligible for tax-free 
treatment) into present interests (which do qualify for tax-free treatment) and 
thereby significantly narrow the gift tax base.193 Such regulations would likely 
cause tremendous havoc in the estate planning world. 194 If the Treasury 
Department acts too aggressively, there would be two avenues of recourse. 
During the regulatory vetting process, taxpayers, tax advisers, and bar and 
CPA associations could mount vigorous campaigns to have the Treasury 
Department change or retract the particular regulation in question.195 Or, 
alternatively, if the Treasury Department ultimately proves recalcitrant, then 
 
 192. Eponymously named after the decision in Crummey v. Comm’r, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968), 
Crummey withdrawal powers are loopholes that allow certain gifts to trusts to be treated as tax-free 
gifts, thereby circumventing the calendar year dollar limit on the gift amount which will be treated as 
tax-free. See Bradley E.S. Fogel, The Emperor Does Not Need Clothes—The Expanding Use of “Naked” 
Crummey Withdrawal Powers To Obtain Federal Gift Tax Annual Exclusions, 73 TUL. L. REV. 555, 556, 
616 (1998) (“Further, while the IRS has sought congressional action, and legislation aimed at limiting 
the use of Crummey powers has been proposed, legislative redress has not, as yet, been forthcoming.” 
(footnotes omitted)); Dora Arash, Comment, Crummey Trusts: An Exploitation of the Annual Exclusion, 
21 PEPP. L. REV. 83, 84 (1993) (“One loophole commonly used to avoid the imposition of estate and 
gift tax is a ‘Crummey Trust.’”). 
 193. See I.R.C. § 2503(b)(1). 
 194. See generally Bradley E.S. Fogel, Billion Dollar Babies: Annual Exclusion Gifts to Minors, PROB. 
& PROP., Sept./Oct. 1998, at 6, 11–14 (documenting the ubiquitous use of Crummey trusts to navigate 
around the annual exclusion problem). 
 195. See, e.g., Oei & Osofsky, supra note 190, at 209 (“We find extensive engagement by 
sophisticated parties and industry groups prior to the official notice-and-comment period, which 
helped shape and anchor rulemaking outcomes. Subsequent comments submitted in the official 
notice-and-comment period led to technical and other discrete changes but did not fundamentally 
change the initial rulemaking approach.”). 
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Congress could pass remedial legislation to safeguard the taxpayer actions 
under scrutiny.196 
The second concern is that taxpayers might assert that the congressional 
delegation of this administrative authority is unconstitutional. While the 
Constitution vests in Congress the power to tax,197 it does not vest this same 
power in the Treasury Department.198 However, as previously discussed,199 
there is a long history of courts sanctioning Congress’s delegation of 
important responsibilities to administrative agencies, and there is no reason to 
assume that courts would act any differently in the realm of taxation.200 
The final concern is one of practicality. In particular, it is unclear 
whether congressional intent, memorialized in a statute’s legislative history, is 
ever truly lucid enough to identify those activities that constitute tax abuse.201 
A related issue is how the Treasury Department should respond when a 
statute’s legislative history is ambiguous or, in some instances, nonexistent. 
Over time, of course, resolution of these questions would no doubt be sorted 
out as congressional members would likely seek to moor statutory verbiage 
with congressional record entries that weave a coherent picture of legislative 
intent. 
The foregoing concerns are admittedly not entirely without merit or 
unfounded. However, on balance, they should not dissuade Congress from 
enacting a general anti-abuse rule that empowers the Treasury Department to 
curb tax abuse. The risks are minimal; if the Treasury Department runs amok 
and challenges specific tax-abuse techniques too aggressively, Congress always 
retains recourse to repeal the law or enact remedial legislation. By the same 
 
 196. See Hines & Logue, supra note 149, at 246 (“First, if an agency acts in a way that 
substantially diverges from the wishes of the legislature, Congress can pass another statute to restrict 
or remove the agency’s authority.”). 
 197. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 198. See Hines & Logue, supra note 149, at 245, 247 (“Granting agencies broad authority raises 
the possibility that they will enact regulations inconsistent with congressional intent. . . . If an agency 
does something egregiously bad, voters find out, and Congress can be animated to act.”). 
 199. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 200. Gary Lawson, Who Legislates?, 1995 PUB. INT. L. REV. 147, 147 (reviewing DAVID 
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE 
THROUGH DELEGATION (1993)). 
Delegation of legislative power by Congress is a pervasive feature of modern national 
governance. In the wake of the New Deal, the federal courts essentially gave up trying to 
enforce any serious limits on Congress’s practice of granting sweeping authority to 
administrative agencies, and today those agencies rival or surpass Congress as the federal 
government’s principal lawmaking organ.  
Id. 
 201. See, e.g., Brian G. Slocum, Replacing the Flawed Chevron Standard, 60 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 195, 204 (2018) (“The Court in Chevron indicated that when congressional intent is unclear, the 
provision is ambiguous, which signals interpretive choice. The Court thereby established a 
connection between ‘ambiguity’ and the absence of congressional intent.”). 
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token, if the Treasury Department is unable to discern legislative history 
appropriately, Congress can legislatively clarify its statutes—and may learn to 
craft more comprehensible legislation in the future. With the country’s fiscal 
affairs in such dire straits, Congress must consider new approaches to address 
national solvency. Delegation to the Treasury Department to counter tax 
abuse constitutes one encouraging measure so far untested. 
D. Utilizing Upstream Tax Planning To Illustrate the Administrative Approach 
Academics are renowned for promoting promising theories that often 
lack practicality.202 This proposal, however, does not suffer from that deficit. 
To illustrate this point, consider how newly minted Treasury regulations 
might address the case of upstream tax planning. 
As previously discussed, the nature of upstream planning is blatantly 
abusive: taxpayers transfer property to their elderly and sick loved ones as a 
vehicle to exploit section 1014, seeking to eliminate taxable gains on the 
transferred property. 203  What is clear about section 1014 is that it was 
instituted (or, at the very least, retained) to facilitate tax basis identification 
for assets owned by a decedent; it was never intended as a mechanism for 
living taxpayers to negate their taxable gains.204 
 
 202. See, e.g., Book Note, The Albatross of Constitutionalism, 101 HARV. L. REV. 908, 909 (1988) 
(reviewing A WORKABLE GOVERNMENT? THE CONSTITUTION AFTER 200 YEARS (Burke Marshall 
ed., 1987)) (“According to [Judge] Easterbrook, modern constitutional theory, with its emphasis on 
interpretive flexibility and ‘the living Constitution’ rather than on the ultimate power of the rule of 
law, is the product of an academic culture that values ‘novelty and creativity’ over practicality.” 
(quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, The Influence of Judicial Review on Constitutional Theory in A 
WORKABLE GOVERNMENT? THE CONSTITUTION AFTER 200 YEARS (Burke Marshall ed., 1987))). 
 203. See supra Section I.B. Well-known estate-planning practitioner, Martin M. Shenkman, 
offers the following advice to his readers: 
A client may have made transfers to a trust to benefit family members. If the portfolio assets 
in the trust have appreciated substantially, can anything be done to increase income tax basis 
and eliminate the capital gains on those appreciated securities? It may be difficult with the 
older trust. But if a new trust is being planned, can something be done differently to 
possibly make it easier to get a basis step-up? Consider adding a parent or other senior 
family member that has a small estate as a beneficiary and also grant that parent a general 
power of appointment (GPOA) so that the assets in the trust will be included in her estate. 
Thus, even if for example, husband created a trust for wife and descendants, the inclusion of 
an elder parent can eliminate the entirety of the appreciation of the assets in the trust saving 
substantial capital gains. Key is that this is a basis step-up on the death of the elderly parent, 
not one that waits until the death of the client or the client’s spouse. 
Martin M. Shenkman, Basis Planning and Other Tips for Practitioners, CPA MAG. (July 29, 2019, 
2:37  PM), https://www.cpamagazine.com/issue-module-stories/1871-basis-planning-and-other-tips-
for-practitioners [https://perma.cc/38TP-BS3X]. 
 204. See generally ZELENAK, supra note 5 (regarding the legislative history of section 1014, there is 
nothing in its enactment which suggests that its institution was designed to ameliorate living 
taxpayers’ income tax burdens). 
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Assume that Congress heeds this advice and enacts a general anti-abuse 
rule authorizing the Treasury Department to identify and curb tax abuse. The 
agency could then identify upstream tax planning as what it is—abusive—and 
craft a regulation that could read as follows: 
Any taxpayer who transfers an asset which has appreciated in value 
directly or indirectly to another taxpayer in order to have Code 
section 1014 apply to such property, and the taxpayer or his family 
members (as defined in Code section 318(a)(5)) directly or indirectly 
benefits from such transfer, then the application of Code section 1014 
shall be negated and such property shall retain the taxpayer’s original 
tax basis in the transferred asset. 
The promulgation of this regulation would likely be met with little, if 
any, public resistance. There is no natural constituency poised to preserve 
upstream tax planning. Most taxpayers know that, from a tax policy 
perspective, upstream tax planning is indefensible. Some might even go so far 
as to label such actions as abhorrent. After all, who would think of defending 
the use of the Grim Reaper to secure tax advantages? 
But reading the proposed regulation raises an important application 
question. How would the IRS know if a taxpayer’s intent were truly abusive? 
This is an age-old issue that cannot be readily answered. Yet, as the IRS has 
done in the past, it could develop a set of practical indicia that could help 
guide its determination. (For example, was the recipient in need of funds? 
Could the recipient use the funds for beneficial enjoyment or was he or she 
languishing in a nursing home? How long after the one-year mark did the 
recipient die? Did the recipient specifically bequeath the gifted assets back to 
the donor?)205 Since the taxpayer’s mindset would dictate the application of 
this and other anti-abuse regulations, the IRS would regularly have to pursue 
this line of inquiry and, hopefully, periodically issue informative 
administrative guidance.206 
 
 205. In other spheres of the law, courts have established criteria to ascertain a taxpayer’s mindset. 
See, e.g., Lowry v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 257, 261 (D.N.H. 1974) (“The critical inquiry is, 
therefore, whether the taxpayer had or intended an ‘expectation of profit.’ To aid in its inquiry, the 
court took into account the following considerations: length of time the taxpayer occupied his former 
residence prior to abandonment; the availability of the house for the taxpayer’s personal use while it 
was unoccupied; the recreational character of the property; attempts to rent the property; and, 
whether the offer to sell was an attempt to realize post-conversion appreciation.”). 
 206. See, e.g., J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, To Hold or Not To Hold: Magneson, Bolker, 
and Continuity of Investment Under I.R.C. Section 1031, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 177, 182–84 (1986) (“[This 
series of IRS revenue rulings on 1031 tax-free exchanges], though not expressly discussing intent, 
demonstrate the importance of the taxpayer’s intent with respect to the ‘holding’ requirement. As 
indicated, the circumstances surrounding the exchange and the specific actions of the taxpayer with 
respect to the property prior to its exchange will be considered highly probative of the intent of the 
taxpayer in holding the property.”). 
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Of course, it is possible that some people will defend upstream tax 
planning. After all, other tax-abuse techniques have had adherents who have 
launched intense lobbying campaigns to have their tax circumventions 
safeguarded.207 And though such defenses of upstream tax planning may be 
successful,208 those in Congress who are willing to succumb to the interests of 
such lobbyists will have to endure public opprobrium, which could be 
especially evident on Election Day. 
The bottom line is that passage of the proposed legislation, coupled with 
the promulgation of regulations relating to upstream tax planning and other 
tax-abuse techniques, will help lead to the elimination of such tax abuse. 
CONCLUSION 
Upstream tax planning is representative of a significant and reoccurring 
problem in which taxpayers, despite congressional intent to the contrary, 
manipulate events and use the Code’s literal language to mitigate their tax 
burdens. Beyond upstream planning, taxpayers have utilized retirement 
accounts in perverted fashions,209 sought to convert ordinary income into 
capital gains,210 and reconfigured compensation arrangements to circumvent 
employment tax burdens.211 Safeguarded by the Code’s literal language, the 
 
 207. See, e.g., Eric Lipton & Liz Moyer, Hospitality and Gambling Interests Delay Closing of Billion-
Dollar Tax Loophole, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/21/us/politics/ 
hospitality-and-gambling-interests-delay-closing-of-dollar1-billion-tax-loophole.html [https://perma 
.cc/ZWB3-2G2G (dark archive)] (“[L]obbyists swooped in to add 54 words that temporarily 
preserved a loophole sought by the hotel, restaurant and gambling industries . . . .”). 
 208. See, e.g., Jonathan Curry, White House Regrets Not Axing Carried Interest, Cohn Says, 158 TAX 
NOTES 55, 55 (2018) (blaming the failure to close the “carried interest loophole” at least in part on a 
“political system in which hedge funds and private equity investors have outsized influence in both 
the House and Senate”). 
 209. For decades, taxpayers could designate their children, grandchildren, or more remote 
descendants as designated beneficiaries of their retirement accounts and then such funds could 
gradually be withdrawn from these tax-free funds over the designated beneficiary’s actuarial lifespan. 
See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9). This occurred notwithstanding the Congressional intent that these funds were 
supposed to inure to the benefit of retirees and their spouses. See, e.g., Bruce Wolk, Discrimination 
Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Intentions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REV. 419, 427 
(1984) (“The Treasury viewed the favorable tax treatment of retirement plans as a tax subsidy 
granted by Congress out of a desire to improve the welfare of employees by encouraging the creation 
of such plans.”). 
 210. One common tax-abuse technique that Congress legislatively eliminated via I.R.C. § 1259 
was selling stock or securities “short against the box” in order to secure preferential capital gains tax 
rates. See Simon D. Ulcickas, Note, Internal Revenue Code Section 1259: A Legitimate Foundation for 
Taxing Short Sales Against the Box or a Mere Makeover?, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1355, 1356–57 
(1998). “Short selling against the box is a financial practice under which an investor sells short a 
security that is already owned.” Id. at 1356–57 n.13. 
 211. Shareholders of so-called S corporations (pass-through entities) orchestrate their business 
affairs to circumvent their employment tax obligations by paying as little salary as possible and taking 
the rest of their income as a distributive share. See Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of 
the Hill: An Empirical Study of the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United 
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IRS has historically been powerless to challenge these abusive techniques, 
costing the nation vast sums of lost revenue. 
In terms of remediation, Congress could continue to use its traditional 
line of attack. More specifically, when Congress learns about a particular tax-
abuse technique, it could put its cumbersome legislative machinery into gear. 
Metaphorically speaking, it can treat one symptom to the next, ignoring the 
underlying disease. This piecemeal and resource-intensive approach, however, 
comes at the steep cost of the patient (here, the nation) being deprived of the 
treatment it so desperately requires to restore its fiscal health and wellbeing. 
This Article, however, champions a far different approach—one that 
breaks from traditional norms. To bolster taxpayer compliance, it advocates 
that Congress instead enact a general anti-abuse rule, granting the Treasury 
Department broad discretionary authority to promulgate regulations that 
would help close the floodgates of taxpayers’ circumvention techniques. Doing 
so would undoubtedly supply a strong weapon to the Treasury Department’s 
tax-compliance arsenal. A minor concern of this proposed legislative initiative 
is that the Treasury Department could potentially act too rambunctiously and 
perhaps curb legitimate maneuvers that limit tax liability. Congress, however, 
would always maintain the upper hand, retaining recourse to change or clarify 
the law in order to sanction or protect the particular tax-minimization 
technique in question. 
With the nation’s spending outlays greatly outpacing revenue receipts to 
the tune of a trillion dollars annually,212 the failure to act is truly not an 
option. In the battle against tax abuse, Congress has a golden opportunity to 
change the strategic balance of power. At one time, the legislative approach 
worked adequately to secure the nation’s financial needs; however, adequate 
will no longer suffice. Something more substantive must be put into 
practice—and that something more is a delegation of enhanced power to the 
Treasury Department. 
 
States Between 2004–2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002–2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. 
& FIN. L. 459, 488 (2010) (“Perhaps most importantly, S-Corporation taxation allows the 
opportunity to avoid significant self-employment taxes as opposed to entities taxed as sole 
proprietorships or partnerships.”). 
 212. See Tankersley & Cochrane, supra note 6. 
